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Abstract 
The purpose of this Masters’s thesis is to examine the securitisation of Russia by the 
Obama administration after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. The main research 
question is to what extent has the Obama administration securitised Russia since the 
crisis began.  
 
This study applies the theoretical framework of securitisation that was originally 
developed by the Copenhagen School as well as additional contributions to the 
framework by other authors. The methodology of the study is based on Lene Hansen’s 
model of discourse analysis. In the empirical analysis section of this study both 
frameworks will be applied to analyse the official foreign policy discourse of the 
Obama administration as articulated by President Barack Obama himself in his official 
statements on Ukraine and Russia. 
 
The study finds that while elements of securitisation are clearly present and emergency 
measures against Russia have been implemented, which could be considered proof of 
successful securitisation, the situation does not constitute full securitisation of Russia 
because elements of securitisation are consistently countered with desecuritisation, often 
within the same speech or statement. 
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Introduction 
In 2008 Barack Obama became the President of the United States. One of his first 
foreign policy initiatives was to improve relations with Russia. He called for a ‘reset’ in 
relations and aimed to find more areas where the US and Russia could cooperate. In the 
beginning of 2014 the Crimean peninsula was annexed by Russia and an armed conflict 
between Ukraine and separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine, which are believed to be 
supported by Russia, began. This conflict is still in progress and the international 
community has placed responsibility for this on Russia. This has led to a significant 
worsening of relations between the US and Russia even leading some to speculate on 
the possibility of a new cold war. The goal of this analysis is to study the official 
discourse of the US within the framework of securitisation theory to see if and to what 
extent has the Obama administration securitised Russia and re-articulated it as a security 
threat. The author expects to find that while relations have worsened and elements of 
securitisation are present in US official discourse, Russia has in fact not been fully 
securitised by the US. The many instances of securitisation are countered by 
desecuritising moves and frequent calls for a diplomatic solution to the issues.  
 
This analysis will use the theory of securitisation originated by the Copenhagen School. 
The theory posits that security issues are created in discourse by defining them as 
security issues. This is done using speech acts that follow a certain structure and the 
grammar of security. The author will also use contributions to securitisation theory by 
other well-known authors on the topic such as Thierry Balzacq, Juha Vuori, Michael C. 
Williams, and Mark Salter who have further explained the assumptions of the theory as 
well as applying them to new cases and expanding the theory to include not only speech 
acts but non-verbal elements of communication as well as redefining it as a sustained 
practice. On the topic of desecuritisation, Lene Hansen’s interpretation will be 
explained and applied to the case at hand.  
 
The chosen methodology for this case study is qualitative discourse analysis. More 
specifically the author will use Lene Hansen’s method of poststructuralist discourse 
analysis and the first intertextual model in that method. Discourse analysis is the 
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suitable method for this analysis, as it is recommended by the Copenhagen School and 
employed often on cases of securitisation. Also Lene Hansen’s model shares basic 
assumptions with securitisation theory. For instance that foreign policy and by extension 
security issues are defined through discourse and by applying and creating identities in 
said discourse.  
 
This study is important in many ways. Firstly, it allows for better understanding of the 
process of securitisation. Securitisation has become a fairly popular approach in recent 
years and thus it needs to be better understood and implemented. Increasing the amount 
of case studies where it is used contributes to this. In addition, securitisation can be used 
to significantly widen the scope of security issues that entities in international relations 
may face. This also creates a potential situation where almost anything can be 
articulated into a security issue, which is potentially dangerous. To avoid this and to 
avoid the view that any contentious relationship between states is automatically 
securitised, it is important to understand the conditions that need to be present for 
securitisation to take place and to know the threshold for securitisation in international 
relations. 
 
Furthermore, the state of relations between the US and Russia affect the security and 
politics of many other countries as both are major influences in the international sphere 
with significant allies. A fully securitised relationship between the two could pull their 
allies into conflict with either the US or Russia or with the allies of either state and 
significantly affect their political situation, both in the domestic and international field. 
Because of this it is important to understand the state of affairs between the two. For US 
allies and specifically NATO members, it is important to understand the US position on 
Russia as that could affect their own foreign policy as well as have significant effects on 
the actions of NATO.  
 
The original contribution of this study is to add to the understanding of securitisation 
theory by applying it to a recent and quite special case where securitisation and 
desecuritisation are happening simultaneously. This also helps demonstrate the different 
forms and levels securitisation can take in practice. In addition, this study helps give a 
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better understanding of recent relations between US and Russia and demonstrates how 
the still ongoing Ukrainian crisis has affected international relations between the two 
important states and by extension their allies.   
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1. Theoretical Background 
The concept of securitisation is mainly associated with the Copenhagen School (CS) of 
security studies. The most prominent members of the school are Barry Buzan and Ole 
Wæver and their book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”, co-written with 
Jaap de Wilde, is considered the seminal work of securitisation theory (Munster 2012). 
This chapter will give an overview of securitisation as seen by the CS, cover some 
criticisms and developments of the theory by other authors, and also discuss the concept 
of ‘desecuritisation’.  
1.1. The Copenhagen School 
The positions and theories of the Copenhagen School grew out of a wider debate on 
whether the security agenda should be widened to include threats that were not military 
in nature or not. The traditional view connects security issues almost exclusively with 
the military and the use of force. The newer approach aims to widen the security agenda 
and claim security status for issues in other sectors (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 1). 
There are potential problems created by widening the security agenda. In the 
traditionalist view, widening the security field too much could result in destroying its 
intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to solve important security problems. 
In addition, the wider agenda for security means that the state is expected to engage 
more in a broader range of issues and this could be dangerous and even 
counterproductive. The aim of the Copenhagen School’s main work is to incorporate the 
traditional view and to construct a coherent framework to define and analyse the field of 
security (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 3-5). 
 
When it comes to a wider theoretical background the CS identifies itself as 
constructivist. This means that they view security as being socially constructed. They 
also see social relations in general as socially constructed but less apt to change quickly 
like the security field. Rather, identities and how people interact between each other are 
more stable and constitute a framework within which actors operate (Buzan, Wæver, 
Wilde 1998: 203-205). 
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One of the main concerns of the Copenhagen School is what actually constitutes an 
international security issue. They claim that security is essentially about survival so 
anything that threatens the survival of a unit is a security threat. Because security threats 
are special in nature, the use of extraordinary measures is justified. This has 
traditionally been used to justify the use of force, but has also allowed governments to 
take other special powers to battle existential threats (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 21). 
What constitutes an existential threat varies in different sectors and is connected to the 
referent object of the sector.  For example in the military sector the referent object is 
usually the state while in the political sector it is usually the sovereignty of the state or 
its ideology that needs to be protected. Also, different supranational entities like the EU 
or NATO could be threatened by the reversal of their integration processes in which 
case both units would cease to exist (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 21-22). 
1.1.1 The process and language of securitisation 
In essence, “security” is the move that frames an issue as being outside the normal rules 
of politics or even above politics. This means that securitisation could be seen as an 
extreme version of politicisation. Issues can be non-politicised, which means the public 
does not deal with it at all; politicised, which means the issue is part of public policy 
and requires government decisions on how to handle them; or securitised, meaning the 
issue is presented as an existential threat and dealing with it requires special measures 
outside normal political procedure (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 23-24). Something can 
be designated an international security issue because it can be argued that it is more 
important than other issues and thus can take priority. If this specific issue is not tackled 
all others become irrelevant because the actors will no longer be able to handle them 
(Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 24). By defining something as a security issue, the actor 
claims the right to handle it with means that otherwise might not be acceptable, such as 
secrecy, additional taxes, limiting rights or focusing energy and resources on this issue. 
The CS considers “security” as a self-referential practice because an issue does not 
become a security issue necessarily because an existential threat exists but because the 
issue is presented as an existential threat in the practice of “security” (Buzan, Wæver, 
Wilde 1998: 24). 
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The Copenhagen school sees the process of securitisation as a speech act. Speech act 
theory states that certain statements do more than describe reality. Rather these 
statements do things (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 26). Because these utterances do not 
aim to describe something objective, they cannot be judged as being true or false 
(Balzacq 2010: 61). The speech act of securitisation has a specific rhetorical structure 
that includes survival and priority of action because otherwise it might be too late. An 
issue is dramatised, presented as an issue of highest priority and then labelled as 
security (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 26). “…/by labelling something as security an 
agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means,” (Buzan, Wæver, 
Wilde 1998: 26). It is these speech acts that will be the focus of the research. 
Securitisation theory studies who can successfully speak or do security, under which 
conditions and with what effects. In terms of studying the speech act, it is important to 
note that the word “security” does not need to be used in the speech act. There are also 
certain issues that do not constantly need to be dramatised because they are already 
accepted as security issues. It is assumed that when such issues are discussed, they are 
already a matter of urgency and security (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 27). 
 
According to the CS, an internal condition of a securitising speech act is following the 
grammar of security. This means that within the speech act there is a plot that includes 
existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out of the situation. A 
securitising speech act also has two main conditions related to its external aspect. 
Firstly, the speaker or the securitising actor must be in a position of authority. This does 
not exclusively mean official political authority. Secondly, there should be objects that 
are generally considered threatening that could be referred to in the speech acts. These 
include weapons such as tanks or even hostile sentiments and referring to them could 
facilitate successful securitisation (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 33).   
 
According to the Copenhagen School, discourse that presents something as an 
existential threat does not immediately create securitisation. Framing something as a 
security threat is called a securitising move and actual securitisation takes place when 
the audience accepts that the issue framed is indeed a security issue and requires special 
measures. This does not mean that the acceptance has to come in a free discussion, but 
10 
mostly that in democratic societies securitisation cannot simply be imposed so there is 
some need to argue a case for securitisation. The Copenhagen School’s concept of 
securitisation does not require any special measures to be actually adopted. Simply that 
the securitising move gain enough resonance that special measures could be justified 
and taken in the future (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 25).  
 
An important measure of securitisation is the extent to which it affects relations between 
actors. A securitising move can seriously upset relations among actors and change the 
rules of conduct internationally. While a securitising move is usually internal, between 
the speaker and the audience (most typically within a state between an authority figure 
and its people), a successful securitising move gives the speaker permission to override 
rules and the following actions can affect relations between actors (Buzan, Wæver, 
Wilde 1998: 26). It is also important to note that a speech act in itself could already alter 
relations between actors. For example, if a state identifies another as hostile or 
dangerous and posing an existential threat, the state identified in such a way might start 
to act differently and maybe prepare for conflict with the state that sees it as a security 
threat.  
 
Successful securitisation has three components or steps: an existential threat, emergency 
action, and effects on the relations between units (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 26). For 
example, an existential threat to a state could exist without anyone doing anything about 
it or emergency measures could be adopted and normal rules of procedure broken 
without framing an existential issue that would justify such actions, but in both these 
cases securitisation as such does not exist.  
 
Securitisation is in itself an intersubjective process that does not determine whether a 
threat is objectively real but deals with perceived threats. When an actor securitises an 
issue, it does not matter whether this was done in response to an actual threat or not. 
Regardless, the securitising actor will behave differently than they would have 
otherwise and this has real consequences. What does matter is whether other actors in 
the international field see the threat as well because this will affect their behaviour in 
response to the situation and affect relations between actors in general (Buzan, Wæver, 
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Wilde 1998: 30-31). For example, if a state in NATO securitises another state and takes 
steps against that state, this will not only affect the relationship between these two states 
but also between the securitising actor and his allies. The latter may accept and agree 
that there is a threat and even join in the steps taken or see the other as paranoid and 
condemn their actions. Both possibilities have far reaching consequences for the 
international system.  
1.1.2. Units involved in securitisation  
According to the Copenhagen School, there are three types of units involved in 
securitisation: referent objects, securitising actors and functional actors. Referent 
objects are the entities that are being threatened by the perceived existential threat and 
that also have a legitimate claim for survival. The securitising actor is the actor that 
declares something as a security threat and that something, mostly the referent object, is 
being threatened by this threat. Functional actors are actors that do not fit into either of 
the previous categories but can still strongly influence the security decisions in a given 
sector or field (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 35-36). 
 
Traditionally the most successful referent object of securitisation is the state. It is the 
most traditional unit in international relations and security studies, and has a certain 
built-in legitimacy for survival. Also, it has been found that size could be a determining 
factor in what is a successful referent object. A small group of people or even one 
individual is usually too small to merit widespread concern and action for ensuring their 
security and survival. On the opposite end of the scale would be groups such as 
humanity in general, which also thus far have not been successful referent objects. The 
state or middle scale objects in general are more successful because smaller groups 
engage and communicate within themselves and thus create a stronger feeling of “we” 
which might motivate members of that group to protect it in case of an existential threat 
(Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 36-37). 
 
However, scale is not the only reason states or nations have been most successful as the 
referent objects of security. Other middle-level referent objects such as multinational 
firms have not been successful because they can rarely claim a legitimate right to 
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survival. In fact, the economic sector has only been successfully securitised in extreme 
cases where its survival is linked to the survival of another referent object, like a state 
(Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 37-38). In addition, system level objects are increasingly 
becoming referent objects. This means that the range of possible referent objects for 
security is widening and could include humanity in general and also systems of rules or 
principles governing international relations could be successful referent objects for 
security (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 38).  
 
A securitising actor is a person or a group that performs the securitising speech act. 
These are usually political leaders, governments, lobbyists, pressure groups etc. Buzan, 
Wæver and Wilde (1998: 40-41) point out that the actor can sometimes be more 
difficult to identify because the individual performing the speech act is usually a 
representative of a much larger group. It could be problematic to determine, for 
instance, whether a high-ranking military officer is speaking on behalf of his unit, the 
military in general or the entire state. One of the ways to solve this problem would be to 
view how others react. If other states or actors hold the state responsible for the words 
and actions of the speaker than the state is designated as the actor. Also, in the case of 
countries the actor is easier to determine because governments usually have strict rules 
in place on who can speak on its behalf (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 40-41). In the 
context of this paper it will be assumed that the person speaking is in fact representing 
the view of the US government as a whole and the speaker in question was selected so 
that they could legitimately represent the state.  
 
In this paper, the aim is not to discuss whether Russia is an actual existential threat to 
the US, but whether it has been presented as such by the Obama administration. The 
author will also not be examining whether the securitising acts were successful or not. 
The aim is to examine how the Obama administration reacted to the role Russia played 
in Ukraine and if it then deemed it a sufficient threat to merit securitisation on an 
international and domestic scale. In addition, the functional actors in this case will not 
be specifically determined or analysed. Rather this analysis will be focused on official 
discourse. 
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1.2. Criticism and developments by other authors 
This subchapter will discuss some criticisms that have been directed against the 
Copenhagen School as well as developments by other authors on the topic of 
securitisation. They will be discussed consecutively because in many cases the criticism 
gives way to a development of securitisation theory from the same author.  
 
The Copenhagen School has attracted a lot of criticism on a range of issues. Some of it 
is on a purely theoretical basis in that the criticisms deal with the theoretical 
assumptions and methods that are used by the CS and also bring out areas that have 
perhaps not received enough attention in their approach to the theory and these will be 
discussed later in this chapter. However, there are also criticisms that suggest the 
concept of securitisation as being inherently dangerous. The main criticism applies to all 
theorists that aim to widen the security agenda in that widening it might lead to a 
situation where everything is a security issue. The CS has already addressed this 
criticism in the main book explaining securitisation theory. In the view of the 
Copenhagen School, widening the security agenda is an act that has serious political 
consequences and as such requires careful analysis on what is meant by a security 
problem and then applying that understanding to a range of issues. Without such careful 
consideration the CS agrees that all problems could be seen as security problems and 
that this is a threat (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 195). Their aim, in fact, is to create a 
very specific framework that would make it possible to avoid such indiscriminate 
widening and seek to widen and limit the security agenda at the same time. As such they 
place several limits on what is security and who can make security (Williams 2003: 
513-514). These limits have been explained more thoroughly in the section that explains 
the Copenhagen School’s theory.  
 
Williams brings out another potential problem in securitisation theory regarding societal 
security. The Copenhagen School states that the focus of societal security is its identity, 
and if that identity is destroyed, the society will no longer live as itself. According to the 
criticism such a construction defines societies as only having one identity and this 
threatens multiculturalism. It could also potentially legitimise intolerance and 
exacerbate conflicts that already exist within societies (Williams 2003: 519). This is 
14 
also partially addressed in the book mainly used in this work. The CS theorists 
themselves bring out as one of disadvantages of their constructivist approach that they 
are not able to counter securitisation by stating that an issue is not a security problem or 
that something else is more important (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 206). As previously 
mentioned, securitisation is not concerned with the objectivity of a threat but studies 
how threats are constructed and perceived. The CS has also acknowledged the dangers 
of widening the security agenda indiscriminately. In addition, Williams himself counters 
this criticism by saying that the critic has essentially missed the point of the approach. 
He brings out that the Copenhagen School has a very radical approach to the concept of 
security and that securitisation is an extreme situation. The single identity is only 
brought out and constructed in the case of a perceived existential threat, and in that case 
the logic of ‘friends and enemies’ is invoked. The construction of a single unifying 
identity aimed against the single identity of the threat or enemy is what distinguishes a 
securitised situation from a simply politicised one. In a normal situation the identity of a 
society or the identities within a society are flexible and negotiable (Williams 2003: 
519-520).  
 
While he counters some of the criticism the CS has faced, Williams (2003) brings out a 
weakness in securitisation theory that is directly tied to its focus on speech and 
linguistics. The Copenhagen School’s approach is very focused on language. Security 
itself is a speech act, securitising moves must follow a specific “grammar of security”, 
and security must be spoken from a position of authority. This approach, however, does 
not take into account the increasingly important role televisual media and images play 
in the world. While speakers often still focus mainly on the text, it is increasingly 
difficult to separate the language from the images surrounding it. Issues in society are 
often accompanied by specific images and these images can vary and thus influence 
how an issue is seen in society. They can also be constantly reproduced deliberately to 
frame an issue in a specific way and can thus also influence the process of securitisation 
(Williams 2003: 525-527). While the Copenhagen School gives effective tools for 
analysing the language of securitisation, no such tools exist for images. There are 
several important analytical questions that do not have an answer. For example, how do 
images influence viewers and the potential audiences of securitisation, how can images 
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be used to help securitise or desecuritise issues and how are they connected to the 
speech acts of securitisation (Williams 2003: 527). While the analysis of images as part 
of discourse is an important part of securitisation and something that needs to be 
developed, it is not relevant to this study as it focuses solely on written language.  
 
Juha Vuori brings out that the concept of securitisation is centred on Europe and on 
democratic societies. This is mainly because the theory was developed in the context of 
European politics and the act of securitisation is often understood as the process of 
moving certain issues outside the democratic process (Vuori 2008: 65-66). He aims to 
explicate the concept of securitisation and then adapt it so that it can be used to describe 
the process in non-democratic societies. He posits that securitisation serves different 
political purposes in different contexts and to understand this process better it needs to 
be studied in as many different contexts as possible (Vuori 2008: 67-68). He also 
emphasises that many believe that non-democratic systems do not need to justify or 
legitimise their use of extraordinary measures, but in his opinion that is not true. Every 
social system needs a certain amount of legitimacy to survive and every ruler needs 
followers. Because of this even dictators need to justify their use of extreme measures to 
a certain extent (Vuori 2008: 68). Every society has rules and if in a democratic society 
successful securitisation can allow for the use of non-democratic procedures then 
successful securitisation in a non-democratic society allows decision makers to break 
some other rules such as morality. In non-democratic societies securitisation can be 
used to reproduce the current political order or to keep citizens in line (Vuori 2008: 69).  
 
To apply his theory to other types of societies, Vuori starts by examining the basis of 
securitisation theory - speech acts. Speech acts are the basic form of human 
communication and they can be divided into five categories: assertives, directives, 
commissives, expressives, declarations. These are simplified types and actual speech 
acts are usually more complex. This means that one sentence could contain several of 
these types, while a whole section of speech could also just be one type of speech act. 
He also demonstrates that the CS concept of a securitising speech act can be divided 
into three elementary speech acts: claim, warning, and request (Vuori 2008: 74). To put 
it in CS terms, the claim could be that an existential threat exists and threatens the 
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referent object, the warning could be that this needs to be handled right away or it 
would be too late, and the request could then be for special measures to be adopted or a 
certain policy passed to counter this threat. 
 
Vuori uses these elementary speech acts to analyse securitisation and shows that 
according to their structure, securitising acts can have different goals. The main focus of 
the CS is securitisation that is used to legitimise a future course of action. He introduces 
four other possible types of securitisation, which are securitisation for raising an issue 
on the agenda, securitisation for deterrence, securitisation for legitimating past acts or 
for reproducing the security status of an issue, and securitisation for control (Vuori 
2008: 75-76). While non-democratic systems may have less need to legitimise their 
future actions, securitising for control or for reproducing the security status of an issue 
could be very important. There are two types the author finds relevant in the current 
work: securitisation for legitimising future acts and securitisation for deterrence. The 
main elements for the first type have been extensively discussed in the Copenhagen 
School section of this paper and reiterated above. Securitisation for deterrence is aimed 
at the referent subject of the securitisation or the threat itself and it warns about possible 
future action. Securitisation for deterrence also starts with a claim and a warning like 
the one aimed at legitimising future actions but it ends with a declaration. By declaring 
that something is a threat, the declarer gains special powers and these powers are then 
used to deter the possible actions of the threatening actor (Vuori 2008: 79-82). 
Essentially, the idea would be to threaten the source of the threat with possible future 
consequences that might then discourage them from further action.  
 
The concepts that Vuori introduces allow for a more detailed study of securitisation as a 
speech act and they also widen the scope of securitisation studies. Analysing all of the 
speech acts through his lens of elementary speech acts and how they are constructed 
remains outside the scope of this analysis. Also, his method of analysing securitisation 
in non-democratic societies is not relevant in this case as we are studying the US which 
is democratic. However, the author will be using his concept of securitisation for 
deterrence to analyse the securitising moves made by Obama.  
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Michael C. Williams (2011: 212) summarises the main criticisms levelled against the 
Copenhagen School by authors that favour a more sociological and pragmatic view of 
securitisation. For securitisation to reach its full potential several concepts are in need of 
further development and, in some cases, redirection. The criticisms run along two main 
lines. The idea of security as a speech act is too thin and formal to capture the dynamics 
and forms that securitisation can take. The other is that while the CS does define 
securitisation as an interactive concept where the relationship between the securitising 
actor and the audience is crucial, the CS does not develop this concept almost at all and 
thus does not include the different forms that securitisation can take depending on the 
audience and context (Williams 2011: 212-213). Nowadays, many view securitisation 
not as a speech act but as a dynamic pragmatic process, which is influenced by many 
other symbolic practices in addition to speech, such as images, gestures as well as the 
audience toward whom the securitisation is directed (Williams 2011: 212-213).  
 
Thierry Balzacq also highlights many weaknesses in securitisation theory. For example, 
the CS states that securitisation is successful when the audience accepts it but how to 
know when exactly an audience accepts that there is indeed a security problem, remains 
radically under-theorised (Balzacq 2011a: 6). Also, the CS sees securitisation as a self-
referential practice rooted in speech acts and as an intersubjective process. Many 
theorists find that the two concepts are in conflict with each other and that the CS 
actually leans toward security as a self-referential act. This view is supported by the fact 
that while intersubjectivity should be connected with the audience and the acceptance of 
the audience is deemed important, the actual analytical framework ignores the audience 
(Balzacq 2011a: 20). He also mentions that the CS singles out three units of analysis but 
leaves out two that in his opinion are equally important - the audience and the context of 
securitisation (Balzacq 2011b: 35) The aim of Balzacq’s view of securitisation is to try 
and fix these issues and create concepts for the sections that remain under-theorised.  
 
Thierry Balzacq is one of the most cited authors of securitisation after the members of 
the Copenhagen School and he also provides a specific framework that views 
securitisation not as a philosophical process (a speech act) but as a sociological one 
(Balzacq 2010: 57). He defines securitisation as a pragmatic act; a sustained 
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argumentative practice aimed at convincing a target audience, based on what it knows 
already, that a specific development is threatening enough to warrant immediate action 
(Balzacq 2010: 60). The following section illustrates the proposed sociological view of 
securitisation and the view of securitisation as a pragmatic act and a sustained practice.  
 
Balzacq (2011a: 1) defines the theory of the CS that focuses on speech acts and 
discursive practices as the philosophical view of securitisation. In contrast, the 
sociological view that he seems to prefer sees securitisation in terms of practices, 
context and power relations that function in a society (Balzacq 2011a: 1). He points out 
that the philosophical view reduces securitisation to a conventional procedure or even a 
bet that depends on certain conditions for the act to be successful. The sociological view 
sees securitisation as more of a process that happens within a set of circumstances in a 
society. If the speech act theory aims to establish universal rules for how securitisation 
is communicated, the sociological view seeks to examine how actors use various tools 
of persuasion such as metaphors, stereotypes etc. to achieve their goal (Balzacq 2011a: 
2). The audience of securitisation is important in both views, but the CS sees the 
audience as a set category and a passive recipient of securitising speech acts that then 
either accepts or rejects the bid for securitisation. The sociological view posits that the 
securitising actor and the audience influence and construct each other simultaneously 
(Balzacq 2011a: 2).  Finally, securitisation is seen as a performative and performatives 
are analysed in the context of the actors and their habits within the surrounding social 
field. In other words, securitisation manifests as a constructed engagement of actors in a 
specific structural environment (Balzacq 2011a: 2). Essentially this means that 
securitisation is constructed in a specific sociological context at a given time. 
 
Thierry Balzacq (2011a) lays out three core assumptions of the sociological variant of 
securitisation. The first is the centrality of the audience. The Copenhagen School states 
that successful securitisation has only taken place when the audience of the speech act 
accepts that something is a security issue, but does not define when such acceptance has 
taken place or what kind of audience is actually required. Balzacq (2011a: 8-9) states 
that in order for an issue to be securitised an ‘empowering audience’ must agree with 
the claims made by the securitising actor. The ‘empowering audience’ is the audience 
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that has a direct connection to the issue and can enable special measures to be adopted 
by the securitising actor. This support and enabling of actions can come in the form of 
general moral support for the actor or also through official decisions or statements by 
different institutions, such as a vote in Parliament to adopt measures or a statement by 
the UN (Balzacq 2011a: 8-9).  
 
The second assumption is the codependency of agency and context. The CS states that 
securitisation and whether something is a security issue or not does not depend on 
objective reality, but on the way an issue is framed. Balzacq (2011a: 13) argues that 
successful securitisation requires that the statements made by the securitising actor must 
be connected to an external reality. If there is indeed visible evidence of a threat that 
could be pointed out during the speech act, the empowering audience would be more 
likely to accept that a security problem indeed exists. This is in some sense explored by 
the CS by stating the need for the grammar of security which includes a reference to 
generally threatening objects like weapons (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 33) but they 
did not require a reference to actual reality, such as tanks being currently positioned at 
the border of a state. Balzacq states that when the concept of security is used it forces 
the audience to examine the context they are in and identify the conditions that warrant 
securitisation (Balzacq 2011a: 13).  
 
The third assumption concerns the dispositif and the structuring force of practices. In 
essence it means that certain security practices and policy measures that are in place in a 
society also affect the way securitisation is done in society. Each measure used gives 
information about the type of threat that is being securitised and affects the practices of 
securitisation (Balzacq 2011a: 15-18). Basically, Balzacq says that the CS speech act 
concept of securitisation deals with how security issues are created, but does not 
examine how they are actually constructed. He sees securitisation as something that is 
facilitated by a configuration of different circumstances rather than caused by the power 
of one speech act (Balzacq 2011a: 18).  
 
Another important development by Balzacq is the concept of ‘referent subject’. The 
referent object is that which is being threatened by the existential threat (state, 
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democratic rule, etc.), but the referent subject is that which is the existential threat 
(Balzacq 2011b: 36). For instance, the referent subject could be a neighbouring state 
with a nuclear arsenal that is considered threatening. It is important to note that Balzacq 
only very briefly mentions this concept along with the referent object and defines the 
two simply as “what is threatened and what is threatening” (Balzacq 2011b: 36). In the 
context of this analysis, the referent subject will be analysed similarly to the referent 
object as they were defined together by Balzacq.  
 
Balzacq’s view will not be used fully in this work, but some of his concepts will be used 
in the analysis. For example, the concept of an empowering audience will be applied 
and the author will identify and analyse the referent subject in a similar manner to the 
referent object. Also, this work will be analysing the speech acts by Obama over a 
longer period of time as part of a sustained argumentative practice rather than as 
individual speech acts that create securitisation.  
 
Mark B. Salter also points out that the solely linguistic model cannot account for the 
complex political procedures involved in securitisation (Salter 2011: 117). The 
Copenhagen School has inherited a statist, decisionist and rather monolithic view of 
speech acts. This has led to criticism and the view that political context, audience and 
history should play a bigger part in analysing and understanding speech acts (Salter 
2011: 118). Salter (2011: 119-120) also argues that the success or failure of 
securitisation cannot be a binary that is based on the success or failure of a single 
moment. He sees it as more of process with several steps that determine the success or 
failure of securitisation. He proposes an analysis of securitisation, more specifically the 
failure or success of securitisation that is based on four questions:  
1) To what degree is the issue discussed as part of wider political debate? 
2) Is the issue accepted or rejected as an existential threat? 
3) Is a proposed solution to the threat accepted or rejected? 
4) Are new or emergency powers accorded to the securitising actor? (Salter 2011: 
120) 
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In short, Salter argues that an issue must be deemed important enough to be discussed 
politically before it can be successfully securitised and the threat must be accepted as 
existential. He also states that possible solutions to an existential threat are often part of 
securitising moves and as such, acceptance of these solutions can be proof of successful 
securitisation, and, in his opinion, even a requirement. Finally, securitisation has taken 
place when new policies have been put in place to handle the existential threat or when 
new emergency powers have been given to the securitising actor (Salter 2011: 120-121). 
He also stresses that emergency measures are significant in determining the success or 
failure of securitisation. The CS does not require that measures are actually adopted, but 
in Salter’s view an issue’s resonance with the public is too unstable to measure and thus 
does not prove successful securitisation (Salter 2011: 121-122). Several of the elements 
included in Salter’s model are part of the analysis of securitisation as seen by the 
Copenhagen School and will be discussed in this work in that context, but the question 
of whether the issue was part of wider political debate will be added to the analysis.  
 
There are many theorists who aim to create a better framework for whether 
securitisation has been successful or not and many of them have the view that 
securitisation has only taken place if it has been successful. The aim of this work is not 
to specifically analyse the success of securitisation. Rather the goal is to analyse 
elements of securitisation as they occur in US discourse and to examine if securitising 
Russia was in fact the goal. In the analysis, measures taken in response to the situation 
in Ukraine will be included as an element of securitisation and as emergency measures 
that could be considered confirmation of successful securitisation. However, the level of 
success of securitisation will not be the focus of this thesis.  
1.3. Desecuritisation 
In contrast to the process of securitisation, this paper will also be examining instances of 
desecuritisation. The concept of desecuritisation is, in the view of many authors largely 
under-theorised and open to interpretation (Hansen 2012a: 527). The Copenhagen 
School has defined desecuritisation as the conceptual twin or opposite of securitisation. 
According to them, desecuritisation essentially means moving issues out of the security 
sphere and back into the ordinary public sphere (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 29). This 
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seems to imply specific moves made to desecuritise, but some theorists view 
securitisation as simply allowing issues to drop out of the security sphere by no longer 
securitising them. Juha Vuori (2011: 191) views desecuritisation as a conscious move 
away from securitisation and states that it could take the form of a specific speech act. 
He also points out that desecuritisation can be understood as deconstructing the 
collective identities and the logic of friends and enemies that was invoked during 
securitisation. Desecuritisation is in essence the opposite of securitisation and it happens 
“away from” or “out of” securitisation (Hansen 2012a: 530), which would imply that 
before desecuritisation can happen, securitisation needs to have happened or be 
happening. In terms of analysing desecuritisation, Hansen has shown that while speech 
acts can indeed be effectively used to counter securitisation, they do not possess a 
specific rhetorical structure like securitising moves do. She states that one cannot 
declare an issue as no longer being a threat because a speech act like that would still use 
the logic and language of security. Desecuritisation still happens as a result of speech 
acts, but there is no specific structure for a desecuritising act (Hansen 2012a: 530).  
 
The Copenhagen School gives a definition for desecuritisation but the concept is not 
developed further in the main book of the CS. This allows for desecuritisation to be 
analysed through a wide range of political theories and also creates very different ways 
in which desecuritisation is understood and applied. In addition to the approaches given 
above, there are some who view desecuritisation as being dependent on new enemies. It 
can happen when a new threat rises and the old one is deemed less relevant and is thus 
desecuritised or when an issue is moved into the sphere of normal politics and no new 
threat arises (Hansen 2012a: 527). Building on the many readings and applications of 
desecuritisation, Hansen brings out four types of desecuritisation. Change through 
stabilisation means that the issue is discussed in terms other than security and the 
situation is more stable, but the larger conflict is still in place. Replacement means that 
another issue replaces the old security problem. Rearticulation happens when an issue is 
moved back into the sphere of ordinary politics because the original threats have 
lessened, and desecuritisation through silencing is when an issue is de-politicised and no 
longer discussed (Hansen 2012a: 529). Rearticulation also means that the issue is 
removed from the sphere of securitisation by actively proposing political solutions to 
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the problems in question and it also includes a conscious move away from the friend-
enemy distinction (Hansen 2012a: 542-543).  
 
In this paper, desecuritisation will be viewed as a deliberate act because not discussing 
an issue cannot be effectively analysed. The main type examined is rearticulation. The 
author will try to find instances where the US has given statements or acted in a way 
that would indicate that the US views Russia as a regular country and would like to 
normalise relations. The study will also look for instances where friend-enemy 
distinctions are deconstructed or rearticulated. Change through stabilisation will be 
included if the analysis of discourse shows that this could be happening. The other two 
types will not be applied to this case. Because the goal of this analysis is to study how 
the US acted towards Russia, bringing in another potential security issue to see if it 
replaced Russia would not be beneficial. Silencing does not fit this case because the 
crisis in Ukraine is an ongoing conflict and as the analysis of discourse will show, it is 
still part of political discussion and definitely not de-politicised.  
 
Desecuritisation will be examined to see if the US has indeed tried to move Russia into 
the ordinary sphere of politics and diplomacy. If this turns out to be so, then it can be 
argued that the US has not tried to securitise Russia or at the very least has tried to 
reverse previous securitisation. This paper will be analysing several speech acts that in 
the author’s view function as desecuritising moves. Because there is no specific 
structure for desecuritising acts, these speech acts will be identified not by specific 
elements or constructions but rather by general content. If there is evidence that the US, 
in its official discourse has attempted to move Russia out of securitisation and restore 
normal relations, this will be touched upon in the analysis.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Discourse analysis 
The chosen method for this study is qualitative discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is 
the study of actions that are carried out when language is used in specific contexts and 
the meaning given to language. In short it can also be defined as: “The study of 
language in use” (Gee, Handford 2014: 1). The author considers discourse analysis to be 
the most suitable for the study of securitisation for several reasons. First of all, the 
group that originated the theory, The Copenhagen School suggests that the best way to 
study securitisation is through discourse. In fact, they state that is the obvious method 
because the aim is to see when and how something is established as a security threat. 
The defining criterion of security is textual, as there is a specific rhetorical structure that 
has to be located in discourse. Their suggested technique is very simple: to read looking 
for arguments that take the rhetorical and logical form defined as security (Buzan, 
Wæver, Wilde 1998: 176-177). They also suggest studying texts that are central. This 
means that if an issue is deemed important enough, it should come up because the 
instance itself is sufficiently important. For example, if an issue is brought up in a 
general debate or speech, that issue is deemed important because actors in these 
situations must prioritise the topics they bring up (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998: 177). 
 
Discourse analysis as a theory and method also has many things in common with 
securitisation theory and holds similar assumptions. For example, securitisation theory 
states that security threats are security threats because they are represented as such. 
Discourse theory assumes that foreign policies rely upon representations and these 
representations are articulated in language (Hansen 2012b: 106). Also similarly to 
securitisation theory, discourse analysis does not judge whether a representation found 
in discourse can be considered true or false, but rather what the political implications of 
adopting a particular representation are (Hansen 2012b: 103). The recommendation 
from the originators of the theory along with key shared assumptions make it a suitable 
method for studying securitisation and as such the chosen method for this paper.  
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Lene Hansen (2007: 5-6) more specifically proposes a model of poststructuralist 
discourse analysis. She states that the poststructuralist research program assumes that 
policies depend upon representations or threats, countries, security problems or other 
issues they are meant to address. Foreign policies need to give meaning to the situation 
at hand as well as the actors or other objects within the situation and these meaning are 
articulated through specific identities of other states, regions as well as the identity of 
the actor itself (Hansen 2007: 5-6). This approach is quite similar to the theory of 
securitisation which also includes constructing the enemy or threat or representing it in 
a way that gives it a threatening identity as well as constructing a Self that needs to be 
protected, and then creating policies that are meant to battle this issue or threat. Because 
of this Lene Hansen’s method of poststructuralist discourse analysis will be applied to 
the case at hand. 
 
In poststructuralism, “language is social and political, an inherently unstable system of 
signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and 
difference” (Hansen 2007: 17). Poststructuralism posits that objects, subjects, states and 
other objects are only given meaning and identity through their construction in 
language. Language is not an objective tool that registers data and there is no objective 
or true meaning to which language refers (Hansen 2007: 18).  Language can be seen as 
political, which means that it is a site for the production of identities and subjectivities. 
Seeing foreign policy as a discursive practise implies that policy and identity are 
interlinked. Identity comes into being through the discursive enactment of foreign 
policy, but the same identity is used to legitimise the policies that have been proposed 
(Hansen 2007: 21).  
 
The construction of identity is central in Hansen’s model of discourse analysis. She says 
that the identity of a state both creates and is itself a product of foreign policy. These 
identities are constructed through differentiation and linking (Hansen 2007: 23-24). This 
means that the Self is defined in some relation to the Other. The goal for the makers of 
foreign policy is to present a policy that seems legitimate and enforceable to its 
audience. Because of this, creating a link between the identity of the actor (e.g. a state) 
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and its policy that makes the two seem compatible is at the centre of political activity 
(Hansen 2007: 28). 
 
Hansen also states that for issues to become questions of security they need to be 
successfully constructed as such within political discourse (Hansen 2007: 33-34). In 
addition she ties the construction of security to the building of a national Self that is in 
need of protection from a threatening Other (Hansen 2007: 34). In the context of 
securitisation theory the Self would be connected to the referent object. This is in line 
with both the main theory of securitisation as well as the discussion about employing a 
friend-enemy distinction to create securitisation and again shows that Hansen’s method 
of discourse analysis shares similar assumptions and theoretical bases with the chosen 
theory for this study. Thus it can be considered a suitable method. 
 
“Official foreign policy discourse is the discourse through which state action is 
legitimised/…” (Hansen 2007: 59-60). For the study of official foreign policy discourse, 
Hansen proposes three models, the first of which is used in this study. The following 
section will give an overview of this model.  
 
The first model is based directly on official discourse and focuses on political leaders 
who have the official authority to sanction foreign policies and also on actors who are 
directly involved in executing these policies. The model identifies texts produced 
directly by these actors such as speeches and interviews as well as texts that have an 
intertextual influence on the discourse. Hansen brings out three specific methodological 
guidelines. Firstly, is that texts can be either single-authored or produced in dialogue 
with other actors such as journalists or political opponents. Secondly, intertextual 
references may be made in support of a proposed policy or as a response to important 
events or criticism from opponents. Thirdly, intertextual links can be identified from 
either references made by the political leader being studied or as they are brought up by 
secondary sources (Hansen 2007: 60). An example of this would be a journalist asking a 
question that brings up a historical link or a criticism. The second model that Hansen 
proposes focuses on a wider political debate that includes media representations and 
political opposition. The third model is divided into two versions, 3A and 3B. 3A 
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focuses on cultural representations found in mediums such as film and television, and 
3B focuses on marginal political discourses like social movements, academics and non-
governmental organisations (Hansen 2007: 64).  
 
The first model is clearly the most appropriate in this study as its analytical focus is on 
the discourse of heads of state, governments, senior civil servants etc. and the object of 
analysis is official texts along with intertextual references. The goal of analysis for the 
first model is the stabilisation of official discourse through intertextual links and the 
response to critical discourse (Hansen 2007: 64). This is in line with the goal of this 
work, which is to analyse the official discourse and policy as presented by the head of 
state and to identify the main arguments that are present in official discourse as well as 
show how consistent it has been. However, the intertextual links and responses to 
criticism will not be explicitly identified, as that would be outside the scope of this 
study. When Obama responds to criticisms in his discourse or refers back to his own 
statements, this will be mentioned.  
 
The first model of intertextual analysis is also selected because that model and more 
widely Hansen’s method of discourse analysis has been used successfully in several 
other similar studies that also studied securitisation in official discourse (Raaper 2012, 
Kullamä 2013, Gering 2014, Oksaar 2014). Additionally, in securitisation, it is 
important to study a securitising actor who has actual authority to create successful 
securitisation and thus selecting a very high ranking state official like the President and 
studying their official discourse is appropriate. 
 
Hansen proposes four elements that comprise a complete research design. These are the 
intertextual model, the number of actors, the temporal perspective and the number of 
events (Hansen 2007: 75). The selection of the intertextual model is made from the 
models Hansen described and which have been explained above. Essentially the model 
selection determines what types of texts by what kind of actors within the wider foreign 
policy sphere are included in the analysis. The number of actors refers to the number of 
Selves - states, nations, or other foreign policy subjects - examined in the study and 
determines for example, whether to study several countries or only one. There are also 
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different options for how to choose the actors included in the analysis, especially when 
studying multiple actors. One option is to study how different actors responded to the 
same issue. Another would be to contrast the discourse of the Self with the Other’s 
perspective (Hansen 2007: 75-76). This study will be analysing one actor.  
 
The temporal perspective determines whether events are analysed in one particular 
moment or through a longer historical analysis. There are several variations available in 
terms of how many moments to examine. A study could include comparisons of a small 
number of events through to a longer historical analysis that could include several 
centuries (Hansen 2007: 77-78). The final element is the number of events studied. The 
term ‘event’ is broadly defined and could include a policy issue such as the Maastricht 
Treaty or wars, which are more traditionally seen as events in history. The number of 
events included is influenced by the temporal perspective. If one event is chosen as the 
focus of analysis then it is a temporal one moment study. However, if several events are 
chosen then the studies are constructed using one of two dimensions. The events can be 
related to each other by the issue (events in a particular region over time) or by the time 
in which they occur (multiple issues in the same time period) (Hansen 2007: 78).  
 
The research design of this particular study includes the study of one foreign policy 
actor, one event, one moment, and the intertextual model selected is Hansen’s first 
model, which only deals with official discourse. The foreign policy actor or Self 
examined in this study is the US. The one event analysed is the Ukrainian crisis and the 
moment in time studied is January 2014 to April 2016.  
 
Hansen’s methodological approach also includes advice on choosing specific texts to 
study. She states that material should be selected by two criteria. First, the majority of 
texts should be from the time under study, but historical texts should also be included. 
Second, the study should include key texts that are often quoted but also texts that 
establish a more general basis for the identification of general discourse. It is important 
to note that primary texts, such as statements, speeches and interviews are given priority 
in poststructuralist discourse analysis. However, secondary texts such as broader 
analysis and discussions of primary texts can provide important background information 
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on current representations found in discourse as well as give historical background 
(Hansen 2007: 82-83).  
 
Regarding the selection of texts in the case of contemporary material, Hansen gives 
three criteria that should be met, especially when using models 1 and 2. Selected texts 
should include clear articulation of identities and policies, they should be widely read 
and attended to, and they need to have the formal authority to define political positions. 
She also brings out the State of the Union addresses by American presidents as meeting 
all three criteria and in a table giving an overview of types of texts she simply writes 
that presidential addresses in general meet all three criteria (Hansen 2007: 85, 87).  
 
2.2. Sample  
This section will explain the selection of texts included in discourse analysis. In this 
paper, the texts selected for analysis fall mainly within the time period starting from 
January 2014 and ending with December 2015, but a few texts from 2016 were 
included. The crisis in Ukraine is still ongoing but December 2015 was selected as an 
initial end point to clarify the scope of the analysis and to avoid having to continuously 
add new texts to the analysis. A few extra texts from early 2016 were added later but 
were limited to early April of 2016. The speaker analysed is Barack Obama himself. 
The focus of this research is to study the official discourse of the US as it relates to 
Russia’s role in the Ukrainian crisis and Barack Obama as the current president of the 
US is the best person to analyse as he has the highest authority to determine foreign 
policy for the US and also has significant influence on the international field in general. 
Also the amount of statements he has made on Ukraine in this timeframe gives plenty of 
material for a thorough discourse analysis. 
 
In terms of the types of texts selected, this paper focuses on presidential statements. As 
explained above, presidential statements meet all three criteria suggested by Hansen for 
analysis of official discourse and thus should reflect the official position of the US. All 
the texts were taken from the official White House web page under the section 
“Speeches and Remarks” (The White House 2016). This selection was made again to 
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make sure that these speeches and statements reflect the official discourse and as they 
were published by the government, this can be assumed to be the case. The method for 
the final selection of texts was fairly simple. As the texts on the web page are organised 
chronologically, the author simply started from the beginning of 2014 and selected all 
the texts where the speaker was listed as President Obama. Then the author went 
through the texts and selected the ones where the crisis in Ukraine or relations with 
Russia were mentioned. Some texts that only mentioned either Ukraine or Russia in 
passing as a topic for an upcoming meeting or as a small example of foreign policy 
among other states were excluded as they did not contain any specific policy positions 
or contain any significant information regarding how the US views Russia. It is 
important to note that this study analysed only written transcripts of speeches and 
statements. Because of this, non-verbal elements of speech such as body language, tone, 
gestures etc. that theorists of securitisation have brought out as relevant to the analysis 
of speech acts were not included.  
 
The texts include speeches, statements and also press conferences where the president 
answers questions and replies to comments made by others. In cases where the President 
was addressing the public or the press with another head of state, only Obama’s 
statements and replies were included. Practical policy implementation, such as adopting 
emergency measures, is mostly also taken from Obama’s own statements. Main 
sanctions will be touched upon in the section outlining the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s 
actions, but the President also gives a fairly good overview of the measures adopted. In 
addition, a few select texts were taken from early 2016 just to have an idea on what US 
foreign policy and discourse in regard to Russia is like. An in depth interview with 
Barack Obama published in April 2016 in the Atlantic was also included in the analysis 
to illustrate his views on Russia in general.  
 
The author also followed the recommendations of the Copenhagen School in regard to 
selecting texts that are central. Among the texts chosen for analysis are State of the 
Union addresses which are considered very important, a speech given by Barack Obama 
in front of the UN, several speeches made in front of foreign audiences as well as 
statements and press conferences given with other heads of state where both parties 
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discussed the topics of their meetings and general policy positions. These instances are 
all fairly important and reflect the importance of the topics that are discussed. Speaking 
time is also limited and this is especially the case in regard to meeting and statements 
given with others. Topics that will be discussed are usually agreed upon ahead of time 
and prioritised because the time for meetings is usually limited. This shows that the 
texts selected were central and reflected the priority of the issue. All together 44 texts 
from the White House page were analysed and 33 of them are referred to in this study. 
The interview published in the Atlantic was analysed in addition to these texts. As stated 
earlier, some were left out because they only mentioned Ukraine in passing or simply 
reiterated previous views and policies. As will be demonstrated in the analysis, Obama’s 
discourse on the subject is quite consistent so the author did not find it necessary to 
include all instances of essentially the same idea. Some texts are also referenced only as 
an example of the kind of occasions where the topic of Russian action in Ukraine came 
up because they too contained the same rhetoric and thus would not have given new 
insight. However, they are useful in illustrating the scope of political debate surrounding 
the crisis.  
2.3. Course of analysis 
The empirical analysis in this study will commence in four main steps. First, the author 
will give an overview of US-Russian relations before the crisis focusing mainly on the 
policies of the Obama administration before the events in Ukraine. Second, the author 
will go over the crisis in Ukraine starting with the anti-government protests in the end of 
2013 also briefly mentioning sanctions imposed by the US as they occurred. Third, the 
work will analyse in depth the elements of securitisation in statements by Barack 
Obama, and finally, a similar analysis will be conducted in regard to instances of 
desecuritisation. Additionally, a brief comparison with US discourse related to Iran will 
be conducted as Iran could be considered a case of full securitisation by the US.  
 
Analysis of the texts was not conducted by statements or chronologically. This study 
analysed the texts by the elements of securitisation. For example, the author went 
through the texts selected and found instances where President Obama had referred to 
the referent object of securitisation, in this case, shared norms and rules about how 
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countries interact. This was done to show clearly whether the required elements of 
securitisation were actually in place and also alternatively to show instances of 
desecuritisation. This was also done in part due to the large amount of texts analysed. 
Going through each of them individually and showing how securitising or desecuritising 
moves were made in each text would have been outside the scope of this work, but at 
the same time selecting only a few key texts would have, in the author’s opinion, 
damaged the credibility of the analysis. The large number of texts allowed for a more 
generalised view of the discourse and its consistency over time and thus also shows 
more clearly the degree to which securitisation has in fact taken place. Selecting only, 
for example, longer speeches given to large audiences could have shown a degree of 
securitisation not supported by the general foreign policy discourse of the President. In 
addition, analysing the elements of securitisation separately as they occurred over the 
course of this crisis also clearly demonstrates that securitisation or, in contrast, 
desecuritisation is a longer sustained process not limited to separate speech acts as 
posited by Thierry Balzacq.   
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3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Foreign policy of the Obama administration before the 
Ukrainian crisis.  
This subchapter aims to give a brief overview of Barack Obama’s policy toward Russia 
prior to the crisis in Ukraine.  
 
Many think that relations between the US and Russia were at their lowest point since 
the 1980s when Obama took office. There were disagreements in many areas since the 
1990s but relations were significantly worsened by the US’ plan to build missile 
defence facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic and by the Georgian crisis of 2008 
where the US sided with Georgia (Hornát 2016). Relations were also worsened by the 
continuing expansion of NATO, which Russia strongly objected to and the ‘colour 
revolutions’ that happened in Georgia and Ukraine in the early 2000s that reinforced the 
Russian view that they were under a political offence. Russia objected to the inclusion 
of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and actually succeeded in stopping the granting of 
membership action plans to both countries during the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 
(Ditrych 2014: 79).   
 
The reset policy in relations between the US and Russia was first announced by Vice 
President Joe Biden in February 2009. The aim of this policy was to improve relations 
between the two countries and to find areas for cooperation (Stent 2012: 126). In March 
2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented the Foreign Minister of Russia Sergei 
Lavrov with a symbolic ‘reset’ button to symbolise a new era in relations between the 
two countries (BBC 2009). In July 2009, Barack Obama gave a speech in Moscow that 
also called for a reset of relations between the two countries. He stated that the US 
wants to see a strong and prosperous Russia that can cooperate with the US on different 
issues. He also said that viewing the US and Russia as opposites and rivals that compete 
for spheres of influence is out-dated. In the speech he also mentioned possible 
cooperation on the Iran nuclear program and on stopping nuclear proliferation (Harding, 
Weaver 2009).  
34 
 
The Obama administration sees the reset policy as a success that has benefitted US 
interests on different issues, helped the management of international security and 
created the basis for future cooperation and better relations between the two countries in 
the long term (Deyermond 2013: 500). There are several concrete achievements that 
Washington sees as a result of the reset policy. One of the most important signs of 
improved relations was the signing of a new START agreement. Another area of 
cooperation was the Iran nuclear program. Russia supported a resolution in the UN to 
introduce tougher sanctions on Iran and also cancelled a planned delivery of S-300 
missiles to Iran. There was also significant cooperation with regard to Afghanistan. For 
instance, Russia facilitated transport of military personnel and lethal as well as non-
lethal materials to and from Afghanistan (Stent 2012: 126-127). Russia also supplied 
helicopters to Afghan authorities and worked with the US to reduce Afghan drug supply 
and the two countries cooperated on the accession of Russia in the WTO, which was 
approved in 2011 after discussions had lasted almost two decades. The Obama 
administration saw Russian membership in the WTO as economically beneficial to the 
US due to increased trade between the two and because it would integrate Russia more 
fully into the global economy (Deyermond 2013: 502-503). This suggests that the 
Obama administration sought to create a partnership with Russia and to involve it more 
in world affairs.  
 
There were other areas of successful cooperation mostly due to the establishment of the 
Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) that included working groups on a wide range 
of issues. In addition, the general tone of relations improved, as well as personal 
relations among the senior members of both governments (Deyermond 2013: 503). 
These examples are brought out not to claim that the reset policy has been particularly 
successful. Judging that is not the purpose of this analysis. Rather these different areas 
of cooperation, the change of tone in relationships, and mainly the change in attitude of 
the US toward Russia illustrate that relations improved between the countries and also 
shows that the US did not treat Russia as a securitised entity or a security threat to the 
US.  
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Even in 2012, when many were saying that the reset policy has completely failed, 
Obama still did not see Russia as a major threat to the US. In fact, in a debate with Mitt 
Romney during the 2012 elections, he referenced Romney’s opinion that the biggest 
geopolitical threat to the US is Russia and essentially dismissed it saying that that view 
belongs in the 1980s and that the Cold War has been over for 20 years (Nexon 2014).  
 
With the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis relations have significantly worsened with 
the US siding with Ukraine and, along with several other countries, imposing significant 
sanctions against Russia. For instance, in the spring of 2014 the US imposed three 
rounds of targeted sanctions against Russian individuals and businesses linked to the 
Russian government (Ditrych 2014: 83). Furthermore, in the beginning of 2016 it was 
announced that the Pentagon has placed Russia on the top of its list of national security 
threats (The New York Times 2016). This shows that relations between to two countries 
have in fact declined. The aim of the current analysis is to examine whether this has also 
fundamentally changed the way the Obama administration sees Russia.  
3.2. Timeline of the Ukrainian crisis.  
This section will give a brief overview of the events in Ukraine starting from late 2013 
and ending with May 1, 2016. It will mostly use news sources and a significant part of 
the second half of the crisis will be based on the continuously updated and very 
thorough timeline of the crisis published by the Centre for Strategic and international 
Studies (herafter CSIS). 
 
The Ukrainian crisis began in November 2013 when President Viktor Yanukovich 
decided to abandon a trade agreement with the EU and instead seek closer ties with 
Russia. This started a period of civil protests aimed against the Ukrainian government 
that quickly turned violent (Yekelchyk 2015: 3). In February 2014 Viktor Yanukovich 
was removed from office, new presidential elections were set for the 25th of May, and 
an interim government was formed. On February 23 Pro-Russian protesters gathered in 
Crimea to protest the new government in Kiev (Al Jazeera 2014).  
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The protests in Crimea quickly escalated and on February 27 armed men in unmarked 
uniforms started occupying government buildings, airports and military facilities in 
Crimea (Yekelchyk 2015: 5). In the beginning of March 2014 Putin got approval from 
the Russian parliament to use military power in Ukraine and Russian troops started 
heading towards Crimea. On March 6, 2014 the Crimea parliament voted in favour of 
joining Russia and on March 11, the regional parliament declared independence (Al 
Jazeera 2014). On March 16, a referendum was held in Crimea on joining Russia and 
the official results stated that over 95 per cent of voters supported this and on March 18, 
Vladimir Putin signed a treaty that absorbed Crimea into Russia (Yekelchyk 2015: 5).  
 
The first round of US sanctions against Russia came in response to Russia’s actions in 
Crimea. On March 6, President Obama issued an executive order that authorised 
blocking property of individuals and entities that contribute to the destabilisation of 
Ukraine, but no names were included (The White House 06.03.2014) On March 17, the 
first round of sanctions against Russia by the EU and the US was implemented as a list 
of targeted individuals was added to the executive order and on March 20 the list of 
individuals targeted by the sanctions was extended (Al Jazeera 2014; The White House 
17.03.2014, 20.03.2014).  
 
In the beginning of April, similar events started unfolding in Eastern Ukraine. Pro-
Russian activists seized government buildings in the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk and 
Kharkiv, and called for referendums on their independence from Ukraine. Clashes in 
Eastern Ukraine continued throughout the spring and summer between pro-Russian 
groups and the Ukrainian military as rebels seized control over several cities in Eastern 
Ukraine (BBC 2014b). On July 17, a Malaysian Airlines flight was shot down by a 
surface-to-air missile believed to come from an area controlled by pro-Russia forces. 
All 298 people on board were killed. This further exacerbated the tensions in the area as 
international investigators had difficulties accessing the crash site and retrieving the 
bodies as well as the black boxes of the aircraft (Al Jazeera 2014).  
 
On August 5, Russia started building up forces on the Ukrainian border and continued 
military exercises that had been held intermittently since the beginning of the conflict. 
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There were also accusations of Russia firing across the border into Ukraine (Al Jazeera 
2014). On September 5, after talks attended by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the 
OSCE and the rebels operating in Eastern Ukraine, the first Minsk agreement was 
signed between Ukraine and the rebels prompting a ceasefire between the parties (Al 
Jazeera 2014, BBC 2014a). Despite the ceasefire, shelling continued on behalf of both 
parties and within a few days reports of renewed fighting in Donbass emerged (CSIS 
2016). Additional sanctions were implemented on September 12, 2014. These sanctions 
targeted Russia’s largest bank, Sberbank, a major arms producer, and several companies 
that conduct deepwater and shale oil exploration (Mohammed, Trott 2014). On 
September 19, a new round of talks was held in Minsk and a buffer zone of 30 
kilometres was created between the parties. Despite efforts, fighting continued and 
Ukraine blamed the pro-Russian separatists for violating the ceasefire (CSIS 2016).  
 
On October 23, 2014 amid continuing clashes, a leader of the separatist movement 
announced an official end to the ceasefire and stated that they will try to take more 
cities. On November 12, NATO reported that Russian equipment including tanks, and 
Russian troops have been seen entering Ukraine and on November 30 a Russian convoy 
entered Ukraine without the governments permission. This was the eight such convoy to 
enter Ukraine and while Moscow claims it was carrying humanitarian aid for the 
fighters in Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian government claims that the trucks were used 
to smuggle in military equipment (CSIS 2016). On December 18, 2014 Obama signed a 
bill that authorised new sanctions against Russia and that also authorised lethal aid to 
Ukraine (Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 2014). On December 19, 2014 Obama 
announced the implementation of new sanctions that prohibited the export of US goods 
and services into Crimea (The White House 19.12.2014). 
 
In February 2015 new talks in Minsk started. A preliminary ceasefire was agreed on 
February 10 and on February 12, a new Minsk agreement was announced that included 
an immediate ceasefire as well as a long-term plan to address wider political concerns 
by the end of 2015. This was called the second Minsk agreement or also Minsk II (CSIS 
2016). In addition to the ceasefire, the main points of the agreement included the 
withdrawal of heavy weaponry by both sides, effective monitoring of the situation by 
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the OSCE, negotiations on the political future of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk and on 
holding local elections in these areas, full amnesties for everyone involved in the 
conflicts and immediate release of hostages and prisoners. The agreement also 
stipulated that Ukraine undergo constitutional reform and restore all social and 
economic links with the areas affected by the conflict. In addition, Ukraine will restore 
full government control over the state border and all foreign armed groups and weapons 
will be removed from Ukrainian territory (BBC 2015).  
 
Even after the extensive agreement in Minsk fighting continued and implementation of 
the agreement stalled with both Russia and separatist leaders accusing the Ukraine 
government of not following through. NATO also put pressure on Russia and the 
separatist leaders to live up to the Minsk agreement (CSIS 2016). On May 27, 2015 it 
was reported that Russia has started amassing forces and weaponry near the border of 
Ukraine including tanks and rocket launchers. Most of this equipment had insignia and 
other identifying marks removed sparking concerns about a planned invasion 
(Tsvetkova 2015).  On June 24, 2015 leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany 
met to discuss the situation in Ukraine and the need to implement the Minsk agreement 
and to de-escalate the situation was stressed by the German foreign minister (Euronews 
2015).  
 
On July 30, 2015 the Obama administration again widened the scope of their sanctions 
against Russia. On September 1, 2015 another ceasefire was ordered to coincide with 
the beginning of the school year the following weeks saw a significant decline in 
violence including a day without shelling for the first time since the conflict began 
(CSIS 2016). In the beginning of October 2015 leaders of Russia, Ukraine, France and 
Germany (also known as the Normandy Format) met again to discuss and ensure the 
implementation of Minsk II and the next day, both sides started to remove weaponry 
from the front lines. However, in the beginning of November ceasefire was again 
violated by both sides and fighting continued prompting Ukraine to threaten to send 
heavy weaponry back to the front lines (CSIS 2016). After a meeting of the Normandy 
Group on December 30, 2015 the implementation of the Minsk II agreement was 
extended into 2016. On February 12, 2016 a new ceasefire was agreed among the 
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Normandy Group set to begin on February 15. At the end of February the German 
foreign minister stressed again that Ukraine needed to implement the reforms agreed 
upon in the Minsk II agreement and in the beginning of March Barack Obama signed an 
order to extend sanctions against Russian officials. As of May 1, 2016 fighting in 
Eastern Ukraine was still ongoing and the ceasefire agreed upon only days before on 
April 29 had been violated (CSIS 2016).  
 
Throughout the crisis, Russian forces were believed to be operating inside Ukraine 
while Russia vehemently denies these accusations. On September 24, 2014 NATO 
reported that Russia was significantly pulling back conventional troops from Ukraine 
(BBC 2014b), which would imply that Russian troops were in fact present in Ukraine. 
In January 2015, the Ukrainian government said that Russia had 9000 troops in Ukraine 
and demanded their removal while Russia claimed that it is falsely accused (Baczynska 
2015). In December 2015 Putin admitted to having military specialist on the ground in 
Ukraine but still denied having traditional Russian troops in the country (Walker 2015).  
3.3. Elements of securitisation in Obama’s speeches and other 
public statements.  
When looking at the reset policy and then how relations between the countries have 
changed after the start of the Ukraine crisis it is easy to assume that the US has now 
securitised Russia or at the very least is treating it like a security threat. The sanctions 
along with the rhetoric accompanying them do create that impression. The purpose of 
this chapter is to apply the theory of securitisation to the rhetoric of the US to analyse 
whether securitisation has taken place and if the Obama administration sees Russia as 
an existential threat and a security issue for the US. The analysis will be conducted by 
elements of securitisation.  
 
3.3.1. The securitising actor 
One of the most important elements of securitisation is the securitising actor. The 
securitising actor is the actor who can securitise an issue for the relevant audience. This 
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means that he or she needs to have significant authority in front of the audience he or 
she is speaking to in order for the audience to accept an issue as a security problem. The 
securitising actor in this study is the US and more specifically President Barack Obama. 
In terms of authority, the US and by extension, its leader the President hold significant 
weight in the world as a leading member of several important organisations (UN, 
NATO, G8 etc.) and as an economic and military power. In that sense, the ability of the 
US to securitise something for other countries of the world should not be in question, 
and this is especially true in Europe as the EU and European countries separately are 
considered important allies to the US and many are also members of NATO. In 
addition, the President is the highest leader of the United States so someone who would 
have more authority to speak on behalf of the country and to formulate and articulate its 
foreign policy would be difficult to find. Because of this, the author believes that Barack 
Obama has the authority to securitise issues for both the US and other countries in the 
world, especially in Europe. Thus, he is a capable securitising actor with significant 
authority and suitable for this analysis.  
 
3.3.2. The referent object of securitisation and existential threat 
This section will analyse what could be considered the referent object of securitisation 
in the public statements made by Barack Obama. It will also discuss the existential 
threat to the referent object as presented in Obama’s statements. These elements will be 
discussed together because in most statements the referent object and the threat it is 
facing are named together. Also, according to the CS, the referent object is not a 
referent object of securitisation unless it is said to be facing an existential threat.  
 
The analysis will show that in almost all instances, the referent object is the shared rules 
and norms of conduct between states. In fact, the more traditional referent objects - 
states - rarely come into question in his speeches. There is little to no discussion about 
the survival of the US or even Ukraine, which is at the centre of events. As the author 
will demonstrate, using Obama’s public statements, he does not claim that the US, 
Ukraine or any other European country is facing an existential threat from Russia.  
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The referent object could instead be defined as the principles of territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. Using Obama’s own words: “In Ukraine, we stand for the principle that all 
people have the right to express themselves freely and peacefully, and have a say in 
their country’s future,” (Obama 28.01.2014). This statement was made in reference to 
the protests and internal political unrest that was happening in Ukraine at the time but it 
is the first instance where the Ukrainian crisis and the fact that the US is involved 
because of principles that need protecting were mentioned.  He also stated later in the 
year when Crimea had already been annexed:  
 
.../And that’s what’s at stake in Ukraine today. Russia’s leadership is challenging truths that 
only a few weeks ago seemed self-evident -- the borders of Europe cannot be redrawn with 
force, that international law matters, that people and nations can make their own decisions 
about their future. (Obama 26.03.2014c) 
 
In several speeches and statements he also says that European peace as a whole is being 
threatened by the violation of these norms. For example “Russia’s aggression against 
Ukraine threatens our vision of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace,” (Obama 
05.09.2014). In Brussels, after a EU-US summit on March 26, 2014, President Obama 
gave a press conference with European Council President Van Rompuy, and European 
Commission President Barroso. During this press conference Obama confirmed that in 
his view, Russia’s actions are not just about Ukraine. More specifically, he said:  
 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine aren’t just about one country; they’re about the kind of Europe -- 
and the kind of world -- that we live in./…/And Europe’s progress rests on basic principles, 
including respect for international law, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
nations. That’s what Russia violated with its military action against Ukraine. (Obama 
26.03.2014a) 
 
In this case he did not claim the existence of an existential threat but said that the norms 
were violated and also stressed that these norms are indeed important as they allow 
countries to develop and operate in peace and that these norms have allowed peace to 
reign in Europe. Because he connects peace in Europe to these rules that are now being 
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threatened, he is giving these rules a legitimate claim for survival. He is implying that as 
these rules are the basis of peace, without them peace in Europe could be threatened.  
 
In a speech given in Poland, Obama again tied the referent object and the threat it is 
facing very effectively by declaring:  
.../is that basic principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty and freedom, the ability for 
people to make their own determinations about their country’s future is the cornerstone of the 
peace and security that we’ve seen in Europe over the last several decades. And that is 
threatened by Russian actions in Crimea, and now Russian activity in eastern Ukraine. (Obama 
03.06.2014) 
Essentially he is saying again that what is being threatened in Ukraine is not the survival 
of Ukraine or any other country for that matter, but the basic principles that govern the 
way states behave in international relations. He also again ties the progress and 
prosperity experienced by many European countries to the observance of these norms, 
thus again stressing their value and giving them a legitimate claim for survival, which is 
essential for a referent object to be a successful part of securitisation.  
Obama also defines the existential threat as being urgent and something that could 
spread. For instance he asserted that:  
…/we cannot stand by when the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a nation is flagrantly 
violated. If that happens without consequence in Ukraine, it could happen to any nation 
gathered here today. (Obama 28.09.2015) 
This is a clear expression of urgency and an existential threat. If a norm is violated once, 
it does not necessarily mean that it is no longer in force or observed. The suggestion that 
similar events could occur in other places in the future seems to suggest that the 
principles governing relation between states are being threatened to a point where they 
could cease to matter or even exist. Thus, these norms are facing an existential threat 
and if they are not enforced now, it might be too late.  
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3.3.3. The Referent Subject 
The referent subject, according to Balzacq is that which is the existential threat and also 
the issue or entity being securitised (defined as a security issue). According to Barack 
Obama, Russia is very clearly responsible for the existential threat. In many of his 
statements, he has said that Russia is the one threatening the norms and rules that 
govern relations between states and violating international law. In addition to the 
annexation of Crimea, Obama puts responsibility for violence in Eastern Ukraine 
squarely on Russia. In a statement made on July 18, 2014 he does not say they are 
Russian troops or that Russia has invaded Eastern Ukraine but he does very strongly 
state that the separatists fighting there have significant support and equipment from 
Russia and it is in the power of the Russian government to de-escalate the situation 
(Obama 18.07.2014).  
 
It is important to note that the referent subject of securitisation can be also seen as not 
being Russia but more specifically Russian actions in this current situation. Obama does 
not state that Russia is threatening international norms simply because of who they are 
as a state. Neither does he describe Russia in negative terms. Rather he brings out 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine and in this case also says that Russian forces are indeed in 
Eastern Ukraine. For instance: 
 
We agree -- if there was ever any doubt -- that Russia is responsible for the violence in eastern 
Ukraine. The violence is encouraged by Russia. The separatists are trained by Russia.  They are 
armed by Russia.  They are funded by Russia. Russia has deliberately and repeatedly violated 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. And the new images of Russian forces inside 
Ukraine make that plain for the world to see. (Obama 28.08.2014) 
 
While this does place the responsibility for the situation in Ukraine on Russia, it does 
not define Russia as being the threat. Rather he continuously states that Russia’s actions 
are threatening the referent object and this is also illustrated in the statements defining 
the referent object and existential threat. For example again: “…/That’s what Russia 
violated with its military action against Ukraine,” (Obama 26.03.2014a) and “…/And 
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that is threatened by Russian actions in Crimea, and now Russian activity in eastern 
Ukraine,” (Obama 03.06.2014). 
 
Another example of securitising Russia’s actions rather than Russia is Obama saying:  
 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine challenge this post-war order. Here are the facts. After the people 
of Ukraine mobilized popular protests and calls for reform, their corrupt President fled. Against 
the will of the government in Kiev, Crimea was annexed. Russia poured arms into Eastern 
Ukraine, fueling violent separatists and a conflict that has killed thousands. When a civilian 
airliner was shot down from areas that these proxies controlled, they refused to allow access to 
the crash for days. When Ukraine started to reassert control over its territory, Russia gave up 
the pretense of merely supporting the separatists, and moved troops across the border. (Obama 
24.09.2014) 
 
To securitise Russia as a country and to constitute that it is a threat to the international 
order and norms, it would have been more effective to simply state that Russia is 
threatening international order and norms. Also, in regard to the previous statements, 
Obama could have securitised Russia as a country by claiming that Russia continuously 
breaks these rules or that it does not respect the same values as other European countries 
do. Rather Obama chose to place the focus very directly on this current situation and did 
not make generalisations or define Russia as an enemy.  
 
Because of these statements, and the ones discussed later where Obama tries to 
desecuritise Russia, the author would argue that in Obama’s view it is not Russia itself 
that is the threat but rather it’s current course of action is the threat to international 
security.  
 
The statements where Obama is defining Russia or its actions in Ukraine as the threat to 
international security are also the ones that most often tie the situation and the 
existential threat to an external threatening reality for the audience. As discussed in the 
theory section, references to threatening objects like weaponry in general could help the 
securitising actor gain acceptance and in Balzacq’s view securitisation requires 
references to an external reality. Obama makes repeated references to the current 
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violence in Eastern Ukraine, the fact that Ukrainian territory was annexed, and the fact 
that foreign troops were moved across the border. Another example of such references 
is  
 
Now, Russia has extraordinary influence over these separatists.  No one denies that.  Russia has 
urged them on.  Russia has trained them. We know that Russia has armed them with military 
equipment and weapons, including anti-aircraft weapons. Key separatist leaders are Russian 
citizens. (Obama 21.07.14) 
 
Not only does this statement again reinforce that Russia is responsible, it also has clear 
references to threatening weapons that are at that moment being used in and against 
Ukraine. This would be an example of a statement that makes the audience look around 
them to confirm these claims and if this statement is proved to be accurate, it could 
increase the likelihood of successful securitisation.  
 
3.3.4. Emergency measures  
This section will discuss the emergency measures adopted to counter the defined 
security threat, which in the context of this paper is the Russian intervention in Crimea 
and Ukraine or more generally Russian actions. According to the Copenhagen School, 
an important measure of successful securitisation is emergency measures that are 
outside the ordinary sphere of politics because such actions show that an issue has been 
accepted as a security threat. In addition, Salter’s theory, discussed earlier in this paper, 
states that securitisation has taken place when emergency measures have been adopted 
or when emergency powers have been given to the securitising actor. 
 
While there are no emergency powers given to either Obama or the US, there are three 
types of emergency measures implemented as a response to the crisis in Ukraine – 
economic sanctions, emergency aid to Ukraine, and increased US military presence in 
Eastern Europe. This section will not specifically cover the amount of aid, the number 
or identities of persons and companies affected by sanctions or exactly where, when and 
how many troops were stationed but rather examine these as they are mentioned in 
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Obama’s statements. A general outline of the sanctions has been given in the part that 
covered the course of events in Ukraine.  
 
The author will also discuss securitisation for deterrence in this section because in 
several cases the deterring declarations were made with the introduction of emergency 
measures and Obama also often explicitly stated that measures are being taken to deter 
further action. When analysing emergency measures, it should also be considered 
whether the measures were taken in response to the issue being securitised or whether 
they were simply a change from earlier policy and unrelated to the current situation. In 
the case of this work all measures taken were in fact related to Russia’s actions and this 
is evidenced in Obama’s discourse and will be shown in the analysis. This is also 
important because the focus of this analysis is Obama’s response to Russia’s role in the 
Ukrainian crisis and theoretically sanctions could be imposed for other reasons as well 
or to punish or deter action in other areas.  
Economic sanctions 
As stated before one of the main measures used by the US and also by the EU in 
response to Russia’s role in the crisis in Ukraine was economic sanctions. This section 
will show the language used when these sanctions were announced and how they were 
formed as a direct response to the crisis. An important factor in securitisation is urgency 
and priority. As said by the CS theorists, an existential threat must take precedence over 
other issues because it is possible that the actors affected by the threat will not be there 
to deal with it later. The fact that the crisis in Ukraine and countering Russia’s actions 
was indeed considered urgent and a priority is best evidenced by the economic 
sanctions. These sanctions meant that regular business was halted in many areas with 
Russia. This in itself shows that they were an emergency measure. In addition, the 
sanctions hurt not only Russia’s economy but also that of the US and especially the EU. 
This implies that punishing and potentially stopping Russia’s actions were considered 
more important than maintaining economic ties and the potential benefits for continued 
business with Russia.  
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There are also several instances where Obama affirms that these sanctions hurt the US 
and the EU but that protecting the norms that govern the way states interact is more 
important. For example, Obama stated that he is taking steps to impose sanctions on 
sectors of the Russian economy and also recognises that this may have adverse effects 
on the global economy but this is necessary to uphold the rules that govern relations 
between countries in the 21st century (Obama 20.03.2014). On March 26, 2014 Obama 
again expressed that he recognises the impact that extensive sanctions have on the 
economies of other countries as well but he also still saw them as being necessary and 
something that European countries and the US have taken into consideration (Obama 
26.03.2014a).  He also stated later in the year that “Europeans have to stand up for those 
ideals and principles even if it creates some economic inconvenience,” (Obama 
05.06.2014).  
 
In terms of making it clear that these sanctions are indeed imposed on Russia as a direct 
reaction to their actions in Ukraine, this was done when the first round of sanctions were 
announced by Obama on March 17, 2014. More specifically he said “Today, I’m 
announcing a series of measures that will continue to increase the cost on Russia and on 
those responsible for what is happening in Ukraine,” (Obama 17.03.2014). This 
language directly tying sanctions to the crisis in Ukraine continued throughout Obama’s 
responses to the crisis. For instance 
 
Based on the executive order that I signed in response to Russia’s initial intervention in 
Ukraine, we’re imposing sanctions on more senior officials of the Russian 
government.  In addition, we are today sanctioning a number of other individuals with 
substantial resources and influence who provide material support to the Russian 
leadership, as well as a bank that provides material support to these individuals. 
(Obama 20.03.2014) 
 
On July 16, 2014 Obama imposed new sanctions against Russia and again directly tied 
them to the crisis in Ukraine by saying: “Finally, given its continued provocations in 
Ukraine, today I have approved a new set of sanctions on some of Russia’s largest 
companies and financial institutions,” (Obama 16.07.2014). These are just a few 
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examples of sanctions taken against Russia but they make it clear that these measures 
were taken as a response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine and as such are significant when 
determining if Obama securitized Russia or not.  
 
Support for Ukraine  
Another part of the emergency measures taken by the US, in cooperation with European 
partners is providing significant aid to Ukraine to help them battle the threat to their 
sovereignty from within and to help stabilise the country and, by extension, the region. 
Early on in the crisis Obama urged US Congress to pass legislation that would allow the 
US to provide significant economic assistance to Ukraine and stressed that this needs to 
be done right away (Obama 20.03.2014). Later in 2014 Obama announced significant 
economic aid for Ukraine by saying, “We’re supplementing the assistance that the IMF 
is providing with $1 billion in additional loan guarantees, and we’ve discussed 
additional steps that we might take to help during this reform and transition process,” 
(Obama 04.06.2014a).  
 
In the beginning of 2015, Obama reaffirmed that they will continue to support Ukraine 
as the crisis continues by announcing 
 
We will continue to work with the IMF and other partners to provide Ukraine with critical 
financial support as it pursues economic and anti-corruption reforms. We discussed the issue of 
how best to assist Ukraine as it defends itself, and we agreed that sanctions on Russia need to 
remain fully in force until Russia complies fully with its obligations. (Obama 09.02.2015)  
 
This is just another example of continued economic support for Ukraine that would in 
all likelihood not be given in a more stable situation. Additionally as it was connected 
with helping Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia while Russia is kept under 
pressure from sanctions, it is quite clearly a measure taken in response to this significant 
crisis.  
 
In addition to financial help, the US along with NATO also provided Ukraine with 
military assistance. In June 2014, when asked about what kind of military assistance the 
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US is willing to give to Ukraine Obama responded “During this crisis we have provided 
them nonlethal assistance that's been critical for them,” (Obama 03.06.2014). The next 
day Obama announced additional aid and also mentioned the type of assistance they had 
and continued to give to Ukraine.  
 
We’ve discussed additional steps that we can take to help train and professionalize the 
Ukrainian law enforcement and military so they can deal with some of the challenges that are 
still taking place in certain portions of the country. And, in fact, today we announced some 
additional non-lethal assistance that we can provide -- things like night vision goggles that will 
help a professional Ukrainian military force do its job. (Obama 04.06.2014a) 
 
In addition to aid given by the US he called for NATO members to give additional non-
lethal military aid to Ukraine.  
 
…/our Alliance is fully united in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity and its right to defend itself. To back up this commitment, all 28 NATO Allies will now 
provide security assistance to Ukraine. (Obama 05.09.2014) 
 
At first, all assistance given to Ukraine was non-military and definitely non-lethal, 
however as the crisis progressed, the measures being considered expanded. For 
example, Obama stated during a press conference:  
 
Now, it is true that if, in fact, diplomacy fails, what I’ve asked my team to do is to look at all 
options -- what other means can we put in place to change Mr. Putin’s calculus -- and the 
possibility of lethal defensive weapons is one of those options that’s being examined. (Obama 
09.02.2015) 
 
Giving military aid in the first place is significant for many reasons. First of all a 
military response to issues is connected to the traditional view of security and would 
imply that even without a widened perspective on security issues, the crisis in Ukraine 
would be considered a security issue for the US. In addition, considering lethal military 
assistance to Ukraine demonstrates an even bigger commitment to it as a security issue. 
Because lethal assistance was not actually granted, it could also be considered an 
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instance of securitisation for deterrence, which will be examined more in the last section 
of this subchapter.  
Increased military presence in Europe 
Another example of a military response to the crisis and the threat created by Russian 
actions is the significantly increased military presence in Europe. This was done to 
reassure NATO allies and other countries in Eastern Europe that they will be protected 
and to deter Putin from further action.  For example, Obama said 
 
…/we’re demonstrating the power of American strength and diplomacy. We’re upholding the 
principle that bigger nations can’t bully the small -- by opposing Russian aggression, and 
supporting Ukraine’s democracy, and reassuring our NATO allies. (Obama 20.01.2015) 
 
This statement includes several important elements. First of all the sentence about 
demonstrating American strength is quite clearly referencing the fact that some actions 
taken by the US had the goal of deterring Russia from further action and to show that 
the US is ready to respond to any increased threat. Obama also explicitly mentioned 
reassuring NATO allies, which is one of the goals of increased military presence and 
this military presence and is mentioned often in his statements. He also declared that: 
 
We’re investing in capabilities that our military needs to deter aggression and defend our 
security and that of our allies. And this includes increases in our posture in Europe to reassure 
our NATO allies in light of particularly increased aggressive actions by Russia. (Obama 
05.04.2016) 
 
In this case he again makes it clear that these moves were done to deter further action 
and to show that the US with its allies is ready to respond if necessary. Obama also 
again very clearly states that this was done in response to Russia’s actions thus 
connecting this increased military response to the current crisis.  
 
Securitisation for deterrence or even simply actions for deterrence come in two main 
formats in Obama’s statements. The first is outlined above in the increased military 
presence and in those cases Obama himself says that the aim is to deter. In other cases it 
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is done by announcing measures that are being discussed and might be implemented if 
Russia does not stop its current actions in Ukraine for instance: “The next step is going 
to be a broader-based sectoral sanctions regime,” (Obama 02.05.2014). The possibility 
of lethal aid mentioned in a previous section is also a deterring statement as it is said to 
be used only if Russia continues on its course.  
 
A more explicitly deterring statement came shortly after the Malaysian flight was shot 
down and the situation in the area had not improved and Russian aggression had not 
lessened. Obama stated that “But we've also made it clear, as I have many times, that if 
Russia continues on its current path, the cost on Russia will continue to grow,” (Obama 
29.07.2014). In this case Obama himself references previous statements promising 
stronger responses and this one is no different. At that point several rounds of sanctions 
were already in place but Obama explicitly states that additional measures will be taken 
if the situation does not improve. This is quite clearly meant for the leadership of Russia 
and aimed at changing their view on whether continued action is worth the possible 
consequences. He went even further a few days later by saying that 
 
But what we can do is say to Mr. Putin, if you continue on the path of arming separatists with 
heavy armaments that the evidence suggests may have resulted in 300 innocent people on a jet 
dying, and that violates international law and undermines the integrity -- territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of Ukraine, then you’re going to face consequences that will hurt your country. 
(Obama 01.08.2014) 
 
This is a clearly deterring declaration aimed not at the audience that could approve 
further measures to be taken against Russia but at Russia to show the potential 
consequences to their actions. 
 
3.3.5. The empowering audience and the crisis in wider political debate.  
This section will discuss the concept of an empowering audience, as it is present in the 
discourse about the crisis as well as examine to what extent was Russia and the crisis in 
Ukraine part of a wider political debate. These will be discussed together as the 
audience and the instances where the crisis was discussed are connected. As explained 
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earlier in this study the extent to which an issue is discussed as part of a wider political 
debate could be considered an important measure of securitisation. The CS states that 
securitisation could be considered an extreme form of politicisation, which means that it 
is a matter of public debate and requires government action. Therefore an issue would 
need to be political before it is securitised and the purpose of this section is to briefly 
analyse the extent of political debate surrounding Russia and its actions. The political 
debate will be limited to the US and to meetings attended by Obama as the goal is to 
study the extent of securitisation by the US.  
 
The sheer number of statements analysed for this study shows that the issue of Russian 
action in Ukraine is quite important in the political sphere. This is also evidenced by the 
occasions on which the topic was addressed and the range of audiences involved in this 
issue. There are two types of audiences to the securitising or desecuritising moves 
studied – the domestic audience and the international audience. The domestic audience 
is empowering as it has the ability to approve or reject moves made by the president and 
through Congress also approve or reject the measures that Obama aimed to use to 
counter the situation. On the topic of Ukraine and Russian actions in Ukraine the 
President addressed the American public on several occasions. Ukraine was mentioned 
in three State of the Union speeches (Obama 28.01.2014, 20.01.2015 and 13.01.2016), 
which shows that it is indeed significant in the general political sphere of the US and 
that the approval of the domestic audience is important. Obama also made a number of 
statements over the course of the crisis to the domestic audience specifically on the 
situation on Ukraine and some were even named “Statement by the President on 
Ukraine” (Among others Obama 17.03.2014, 20.03.2104, 18.07.2014, 29.07.2014). The 
topic also came up at press conferences given by the President in Washington DC 
(Obama 01.08.2014, 02.10.2015) and in meetings with military leadership (Obama 
05.04.2016).  
 
In the case of the domestic audience Obama also directly addressed Congress and 
requested that the proposed measures to counter Russian actions be approved as shown 
in the section on emergency measures. Because Congress was directly addressed and in 
fact has the means to approve or reject measures they are a great example of an 
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empowering audience. As sanctions and significant funds for assisting Ukraine and 
increasing military presence in Europe were in fact approved by Congress and the 
measures implemented, it could be said that securitising moves in the case of Ukraine 
were successful, as they were accepted by the audience.  
 
Another sphere of political debate and by extension a different audience for the crisis on 
Ukraine is the international field. The international audience is significant because 
almost all measures taken by the US were in cooperation with the EU or NATO. As 
shown earlier, the military assistance given to Ukraine was in cooperation with NATO 
allies as was the increased military presence in Eastern Europe. Financial assistance was 
given in cooperation with IMF and sanctions were discussed and implemented together 
with the EU. Significantly because the EU arguably suffers more due to the economic 
sanctions, convincing them of the necessity of these measures could be even more 
important than convincing the domestic audience. In addition, sanctions are quite 
ineffective when only applied by one country so convincing European allies is very 
important. One of the most significant examples of a speech given to an international 
audience is one delivered to the UN General Assembly. In that case the potential 
audience was almost the entire world and in the speech Obama repeated his usual 
rhetoric in the case of Ukraine, which is to name Russia as responsible for threatening 
significant international norms and also emphasise the importance of those norms 
(Obama 24.09.2014). He also discussed Ukraine in front of the General Assembly a 
year later (Obama 28.09.2015). To bring up this topic at such an important event clearly 
shows the importance of the issue not only in the context of establishing general 
importance in the sphere of international politics but also in applying the CS 
recommendation to study central texts and instances as they show what are the most 
important topics.  
 
The topic of the crisis in Ukraine and Russian actions was also discussed in several 
meetings and subsequent joint press conferences with foreign heads of state like Angela 
Merkel (Obama 02.05.2014, 09.02.2015) and David Cameron (Obama 05.06.2014, 
16.01.2015), meetings with the leadership of the EU (Obama 26.03.2014a), Secretary 
Generals of NATO (Obama 26.03.2014b, 26.05.2015, 04.04.2016), and the NATO 
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summit (Obama 05.09.2014). Furthermore it was the central topic of important speeches 
delivered by Obama to different audiences in Europe (Obama 26.03.2014c, 
04.06.2014b, 03.09.2014b). In all of these speeches and statements Obama continued to 
stress the importance of supporting Ukraine and protecting the international norms at 
stake as well as naming Russia as clearly responsible. Such widespread discussion on 
the topic of the crisis in Ukraine demonstrates that it is indeed discussed as part of wider 
political debate and also that it is considered important enough to take precedence in 
many important meetings.  
 
The purpose of this section was to demonstrate that in addition to elements of 
securitisation being present in statements made by President Barack Obama, the 
underlying conditions, that the issue is deemed important in wider political debate and 
that the securitising speech acts are addressed to an empowering audience, are fulfilled 
as well.  
 
3.4. Instances of desecuritisation in Barack Obama’s public 
statements. 
Based on the earlier section, it could be quite easy to conclude that Russia or at least 
Russian actions in Ukraine have been effectively securitised as the conditions for 
securitisation have been met. There is a clear securitising actor that within a wide 
political debate on the issue and while addressing an empowering audience identifies 
the referent object and the referent subject, shows an existential threat as well as 
demonstrates why the referent object needs to survive, and proposes several different 
emergency measures to counter the threat that are put in force. While it can be shown 
that there are clear elements of securitisation in Obama’s statements about Ukraine 
and/or Russia, almost every statement he makes also includes elements of 
desecuritisation, often in the form of a bid for Russia to normalise relations. Obama 
stresses on many occasions that he does not wish to make an enemy of Russia and also, 
that NATO does not see Russia as an enemy. In a statement made on March 20, 2014, 
during which Obama clearly named Russia as being responsible for threats and 
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announced sanctions, he also said “Diplomacy between the United States and Russia 
continues,” (Obama 20.03.2014). Furthermore, he states that Russia has a different path 
available as soon as they start seeking a diplomatic solution to the situation with 
Ukraine and that in this case they would have the support of the international 
community. Obama says that Ukraine should not have to choose between Russia and the 
US or the West in general (Obama 20.03.2014). If desecuritisation is defined as moving 
something into the realm of ordinary politics then emphasising continuing diplomatic 
relations with Russia can be considered a desecuritising move. In addition, Obama 
stressing the possibility of a diplomatic solution as soon as Russia agrees to it shows his 
reluctance to securitise Russia completely, and his statement about not having to choose 
between Russia and the US indicates that he does not wish to see Russia as being the 
enemy or even on the opposite side of the US.  
 
There are several other statements and quotes in the period from 2014 to the end of 
2015 in which Obama follows a similar rhetorical structure. He identifies Russia as 
responsible for events in Ukraine, mentions sanctions, and the norms that the US is 
fighting for with these sanctions but then stresses the possibility of normalising relations 
and finding a diplomatic solution. The following are a few examples of such statements 
made by Obama, more specifically the sections where he stresses the diplomatic and 
friendly solution to the issue.  
 
.../And that’s why, throughout this crisis, we will combine our substantial pressure on Russia 
with an open door for diplomacy. I believe that for both Ukraine and Russia, a stable peace will 
come through de-escalation -- direct dialogue between Russia and the government of Ukraine 
and the international community. /...(Obama 26.03.2014c) 
 
…/And our hope is, is that, in fact, Mr. Putin recognizes there’s a way for him to have good 
relations with Ukraine, good relations with Europe, good relations with the United States.  But 
it cannot be done through the kinds of intimidation and coercion that we’re seeing take place 
right now in eastern Europe [Ukraine]. (Obama 02.05.2014) 
 
Moreover, a different path is available – the path of diplomacy and peace and the ideals this 
institution is designed to uphold. The recent cease-fire agreement in Ukraine offers an opening 
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to achieve that objective. If Russia takes that path – a path that for stretches of the post-Cold 
War period resulted in prosperity for the Russian people – then we will lift our sanctions and 
welcome Russia’s role in addressing common challenges./.../And that’s the kind of cooperation 
we are prepared to pursue again—if Russia changes course. (Obama 24.09.2014) 
 
These are all clear bids for de-escalation and desecuritisation of the issue. Hansen’s 
concept of desecuritisation through rearticulation involves actively proposing political 
solutions to the issue and that is exactly what Obama is doing in all of these instances 
and other’s which have not been quoted above. These statements show a clear desire for 
desecuritisation by Obama. 
 
One of the most important elements of desecuritisation is breaking the friend-enemy 
distinction. The logic of friends and enemies or Us vs. Them is often used in 
securitisation and because of that a dismantling of that distinction shows 
desecuritisation quite effectively. There are several instances where Obama very clearly 
rejects the view that Russia is somehow the opposite or an enemy of the US. For 
instance he said “…/But it is not in the cards for us to see a military confrontation 
between Russia and the United States in this region,” (Obama 28.08.2014).  
Additionally he stated earlier in the year “.../Understand, as well, this is not another 
Cold War that we’re entering into./.../The United States and NATO do not seek any 
conflict with Russia,” (Obama 26.03.2014c).  
 
Obama has been very clear throughout his response to this crisis that he does not see 
Russia as an enemy to the United States, NATO or Europe. To emphasize this he said 
“Our NATO Alliance is not aimed “against” any other nation; we’re an alliance of 
democracies dedicated to our own collective defense,” (03.09.2014b). This statement is 
again a clear step away from any friend-enemy distinction and also a statement that 
emphasises that the US and NATO do not wish also to be seen as the enemy to Russia. 
 
A further step away from such opposition is Obama’s constant reassurance that the US 
does not wish to weaken Russia or isolate it. If a state has a fully securitised view of 
another and sees it as an enemy and a threat it would be easy to assume that the goal of 
that state would be to weaken the source of the threat. In the current case, if Russia is 
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the threat, a weak Russia could be the goal as it is then potentially less threatening. This 
seems to be the opposite of Obama’s approach to Russia. In fact Obama makes a point 
of stressing that that is not what the US wants. In several statements regarding the 
situation in Ukraine he says in different ways that the US is interested in a Russia that is 
strong, capable and that participates in the world in a constructive way. For example: 
“So America, and the world and Europe, has an interest in a strong and responsible 
Russia, not a weak one,” (Obama 26.03.2014c) and “I’ve said consistently our 
preference is a strong, productive, cooperative Russia,” (Obama 03.09.2014a). Obama 
also said 
 
And I just want to emphasize here once again /.../ we are not looking for Russia to fail. We are 
not looking for Russia to be surrounded and contained and weakened. Our preference is for a 
strong, prosperous, vibrant, confident Russia that can be a partner with us on a whole host of 
global challenges. And that’s how I operated throughout my first term in office. (Obama 
09.02.2015) 
 
All of these statements emphasise that the US does not wish to eliminate or weaken a 
state that it views as a threat to international security in the author’s view demonstrates 
again even if Russia is the referent subject of securitisation and not Russia’s actions, 
then Obama in fact does not wish to securitise Russia. This has been shown above in the 
statements mentioned and was once again reiterated in Estonia where the President said: 
 
We have no interest in weakening Russia. It’s a nation with a rich history and a remarkable 
people. We do not seek out confrontation with Russia.  Over the past two decades, the United 
States has gone to great lengths to welcome Russia into the community of nations and to 
encourage its economic success. We welcome a Russia that is strong and growing and 
contributes to international security and peace, and that resolves disputes peacefully, with 
diplomacy. (Obama 03.09.2014b) 
 
On this occasion Obama not only said that they do not wish to weaken or isolate Russia, 
he also references his previous ‘reset’ policy and seems to suggest that that is still the 
goal. Additionally he again emphasises that the US does not want to be in conflict with 
58 
Russia and does not see it as an adversary and even goes so far as to praise Russia as a 
country.  
 
In an earlier section discussing emergency measures, giving military aid to Ukraine and 
increasing US military presence was shown as a possible military response to a security 
problem. Obama himself does not seem to look at it that way. In fact he said: “We are 
not taking military action to solve the Ukrainian problem. What we’re doing is to 
mobilize the international community to apply pressure on Russia./…” (Obama 
28.08.2014). This again seems like a clear step away from securitisation. If military 
action is taken traditionally to counter security threats then ruling out military action 
would imply it is not a serious security threat for the US. He also said earlier in 2014 
that  
 
Now, keep in mind I think I’ve been very clear that military options are not on the table in 
Ukraine because this is not a situation that would be amenable to a clear military solution. 
(Obama 17.04.2014) 
 
Both statements can be seen as a step away from the traditional security and military 
aspects of this issue as well as a reassurance that the US will not put troops on the 
ground in Ukraine. Emphasising this could serve to appease the US public that they are 
not entering another war or it could also reassure Russia that a full blown conflict is not 
in the cards between the two countries. In the interview published in The Atlantic 
Obama quite clearly said that Ukraine is not worth going to war over  
 
There are ways to deter, but it requires you to be very clear ahead of time about what is worth 
going to war for and what is not. Now, if there is somebody in this town that would claim that 
we would consider going to war with Russia over Crimea and eastern Ukraine, they should 
speak up and be very clear about it. (Goldberg 2016) 
 
By saying that, Obama is making it very clear that Ukraine will not be a reason for the 
US to go to war against Russia effectively severely limiting possible responses to the 
crisis and also undercutting the security status of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s role 
in it.  
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Another slightly controversial tactic that Obama has employed is implying that Russia is 
not strong and therefore not a strong threat. If this was indeed done to desecuritise 
Russia, it was most likely a desecuritising move aimed at the domestic audience to 
lessen the image of Russia as a threat to the US and also potentially to assuage fears 
about the US becoming weaker. This was most clearly evidenced by the following 
statement from Obama:  
 
Russia is not stronger as a consequence of what they’ve been doing./.../And what I’ve 
consistently offered -- from a position of strength, because the United States is not subject to 
sanctions and we’re not contracting 4 percent a year -- what I’ve offered is a pathway whereby 
they can get back onto a path of growth and do right by their people. (Obama 02.10.2015) 
 
Essentially he is saying that Russia is in a weaker position in the world than the US and 
this is even done through a direct contrast between the two. This view was repeated in 
his speech to the UN General Assembly. He referenced the view also held by many 
Americans that Russia is a resurgent force and that the new Cold War is imminent and 
responded by pointing out that Russia is not stronger than before but rather weaker and 
that “Sanctions have led to capital flight, a contracting economy, a fallen ruble, and the 
emigration of more educated Russians,” (Obama 28.09.2015). This implies again that he 
does not share the view of a possible new Cold War between the two and that he 
believes Russia is now weaker than before and thus a less formidable rival and in the 
interview given to The Atlantic he says:  
 
…/And the notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now, in Syria or in 
Ukraine, than they were before they invaded Ukraine or before he had to deploy 
military forces to Syria is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in 
foreign affairs or in the world generally. (Goldberg 2016) 
 
In the same interview he makes it clear that while he understands that Russia could be 
dangerous he does not consider it a top threat to the US and instead sees the most 
threatening country potentially being China and also defines climate change as a 
potential existential threat (Goldberg 2016).  
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In addition to the desecuritising discourse emerging from Obama, there are also 
examples of continued cooperation between the two countries and US policy reflects a 
continuing outreach towards Russia aimed and repairing relations. For example, it was 
reported that in December 2014, with sanctions aimed against Russia in force and armed 
conflict in Ukraine continuing, a lengthy review of foreign policy toward Russia was 
conducted and Obama made a conscious decision to continue finding points of co-
operation with Russia. Secretary of State John Kerry has continuously been in contact 
with Sergei Lavrov and has reportedly discussed potential cooperation on issues like 
Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea and Syria (Rogin 2014). This policy has been reflected 
in Obama’s discourse. For example he said  
 
There’s never been a point in time in which we said that we don’t want Russia or other 
countries that may have differences with us on a whole host of other things to avoid working 
with us against ISIL. (Obama 24.11.2015) 
 
Here Obama says that they have differences with Russia but that there are still areas 
where they can cooperate effectively and can be partners. Grouping Russia with other 
countries that have differences with the US seems to suggest that their current 
relationship with Russia is not worse than with others and that this disagreement does 
not destroy the relationship between two countries. In another statement he praises the 
nuclear cooperation still happening with Russia by saying  
 
Working with Russia, we’re on track to eliminate enough Russian highly enriched uranium for 
about 20,000 nuclear weapons, which we are converting to electricity here in the United States. 
(Obama 01.04.2016)   
 
In conclusion the author would argue that because the two countries still communicate 
and cooperate and because Barack Obama in his rhetoric has continuously moved away 
from a friend-enemy distinction in relation to Russia and actively proposed a political 
solution to the issue it can be said that Obama has actively desecuritised Russia 
consistently throughout the crisis.  
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3.5. Comparison with Iran 
To illustrate the extent that securitisation can take, the author will discuss the 
securitisation of Iran by the US. This was mainly done by the Bush administration in the 
early 2000s but will constitute a comparison for levels of securitisation. In terms of 
securitising Iran, an important moment came in 2002 when Bush defined the concept of 
the axis of evil. This meant a group of states including Iraq, Iran and North Korea that 
are inherently evil and enemies to the US (Brennan 2008: 172). In 2006 a renewed 
version of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America was published 
and according to that document the US government was obligated to predict and 
neutralise potential threats to the state using all necessary measures. In the same 
document Iran was identified as the single most dangerous country to the US (Dunn 
2007: 20). Essentially this paper says that if Iran is deemed threatening enough, military 
action against the country is warranted and could even be pre-emptive. In some 
academic articles, Iran is characterised as ‘aggressive’, ‘anti-American’, and even 
murderous (Pollack, Takeyh, 2005) and a US academic Joshua Muravchik even called 
upon President Bush to bomb Iran before leaving office (Dunn 2005: 21).  
 
The rhetoric against Iran has significantly softened during Barack Obama’s term in 
office, but there are still significant differences in how he talks about Iran and how he 
talks about Russia. If Iran is defined as inherently evil, untrustworthy and a country that 
sponsors terrorism and sees the US as its biggest enemy then, as shown above, the 
discourse regarding Russia does not reach those levels. The discourse against Iran 
touched upon its identity and said that Iran is inherently dangerous, but in discourse 
regarding Russia the criticism is aimed against the actions of the country, not the 
identity of the country. In addition, Obama stated that “There are no guarantees that 
negotiations will succeed, and I keep all options on the table to prevent a nuclear Iran,” 
(Obama 20.01.2015) but in the case of Russia using military force against Russia has 
never been discussed as an option and even sending military aid to Ukraine to help fight 
the separatists supported by Russia has been limited to non-lethal assistance. This all 
implies that Iran is considered a worse security threat to the US than Russia.  
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Even though Obama’s rhetoric regarding Iran is significantly softer than that of his 
predecessor he still defines Iran as an enemy while going out of his way to show that 
Russia is not considered its enemy. This means that the friend-enemy distinction that 
was consistently rejected by Obama in regard to Russia and is often employed in cases 
of securitisation is clearly present in the case of Iran. For example in the interview given 
to The Atlantic in April 2016 he stated “Iran, since 1979, has been an enemy of the 
United States, and has engaged in state-sponsored terrorism, is a genuine threat to Israel 
and many of our allies, and engages in all kinds of destructive behavior,” (Goldberg 
2016). This rhetoric is in very clear contrast to the way Obama has talked about Russia 
and shows that while Iran could be considered securitised as a country, the view on 
Russia is not as extreme. The author would argue that in addition to the active 
desecuritisation rhetoric shown above, this comparison with a state defined as an enemy 
in no uncertain terms, shows that Russia has in fact not been fully securitised by the US.  
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the discourse of the Obama administration 
toward Russia since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis to see whether Russia has 
been securitised and treated like a security threat to the US. This was done using 
President Obama’s public statements as he is the highest representative of the country 
and thus has the authority to speak on foreign policy and securitise issues for the US and 
even internationally. The analysis was conducted using the framework of securitisation 
as created by the CS and further developed by other authors. The study also applied 
Lene Hansen’s model of discourse analysis and more specifically the model designed 
specifically to analyse official discourse.  
 
After examining Barack Obama’s statements, the author argues that while elements of 
securitisation are clearly and effectively present in Barack Obama’s discourse to the 
extent that securitisation can even be judged as successful, it has been consistently 
countered with clear elements of desecuritisation. Even without the comparison to Iran 
and even if Russia is considered the referent subject of securitisation in Obama’s 
discourse it is quite clear that securitising Russia was not the aim of Barack Obama’s 
policy as he consistently desecuritised Russia and went out of his way to clarify that the 
US does not see Russia as an enemy. Because of this the author would claim that Russia 
has not been securitised by the Obama administration. Rather it would seem that 
Obama’s goal was to effectively respond to a crisis happening in Europe and to make it 
clear that this is an issue of extreme and existential importance while simultaneously 
trying to not alienate Russia completely. His frequent bids for de-escalation and 
diplomacy would also suggest that even if Russia is now securitised for the US, which 
could be argued as it was named a significant security threat by the Pentagon, this was 
not the aim of Barack Obama’s policy.   
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Kokkuvõte 
 
Obama administratsiooni poolne Venemaa julgeolekustamine seoses Ukraina kriisiga 
 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk on uurida Obama administratsiooni poolset Venemaa 
julgeolekustamist pärast Ukraina kriisi algust 2014. aastal. Eesmärk on eelkõige 
analüüsida Barack Obama enda ütlusi ja teha kindlaks, kas ja millisel tasemel 
julgeolekustamine tõepoolest aset leidis.  
 
Töö uurimisteema on oluline nii teoreetilisest kui ka praktilisest vaatepunktist. 
Julgeolekustamine on muutunud üheks rahvusvaheliste suhete populaarsemaks 
teooriaks ning seetõttu on selle avamine ja mõistmine väga oluline. Venemaa ja USA 
vahelised suhted on olulised väga paljude riikide jaoks kuna mõlemal tegutsejal on palju 
liitlasi, kelle välispoliitikat need kaks suurriiki oluliselt mõjutavad. Julgeolekustatud 
vaade USA poolt Venemaale toob kaasa reaalseid poliitilisi tagajärgi nii mõlemale neist 
kui ka mõlema liitlastele, mistõttu on oluline mõista, missugune on USA vaade 
tegelikult.  
 
Töö esimene peatükk annab ülevaate uurimuse teoreetilisest raamistikust, mis baseerub 
eelkõige Kopenhaageni koolkonnale ja nende julgeolekustamise käsitlusele. 
Kopenhageni koolkonna juured on konstruktivistlikes käsitlustes ning nende teooria 
käsitleb julgeolekuohtude konstrueerimist läbi kõneaktide, mis ei kirjelda lihtsalt 
ümbritsevat reaalsust, vaid mõjutavad seda ise. Kopenhaageni koolkond väidab, et 
julgeolekuprobleem tekib siis, kui miski defineeritakse kui julgeolekuprobleem ja 
eksistentsiaalne oht. Eksistentsiaalne oht annab tegutsejatele õiguse kasutada probleemi 
lahendamiseks erakorralisi meetmeid ning tõstab probleemiga tegelemise välja 
tavapoliitika sfäärist.  
 
Kopenhaageni koolkond eristab julgeolekustamises kolme eri tüüpi tegutsejaid või 
ühikuid. Need on julgeolekustav tegutseja, kes on autoriteetsel positsioonil ning kes 
oma kõneaktidega üritab publikut veenda, et eksisteerib julgeolekuoht; referentobjekt, 
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mis on see, mida konkreetne julgeolekuoht ähvardab ning millel on õigus ellujäämisele; 
ja funktsionaalsed tegutsejad, kes ei sobi eelmistesse kategooriatesse, aga mõjutavad 
oluliselt teatud valdkonna julgeolekusfääri. 
 
Lisaks Kopenhaageni koolkonnale kasutab käesolev töö analüüsis teiste teoreetikute 
panuseid julgeolekustamise teooriasse. Näiteks Thierry Balzacqi poolt sisse toodud 
referentsubjekt, mis tähendab subjekti, mida konkreetne eksistentsiaalne oht ähvardab ja 
volitusi või võimu andev publik (empowering audience), kellel on võim kas 
aksepteerida või tagasi lükata julgeolekustava sammu tegija poolt välja pakutud 
erakorralised meetmed eksistentsiaalse ohuga võitlemiseks. Lisaks rakendab käesolev 
analüüs ka tema käsitlust julgeolekustamisest kui pikemaajalisest protsessist, mitte vaid 
üksikutest kõneaktidest. See peegeldub empiirilise analüüsi ülesehituses, mis analüüsib 
julgeolekustamist elementide kaupa ning näitab nende elementide kohalolu diskursuses 
pikema ajaperioodi vältel. Julgeolekustamise analüüsis rakendab autor ka Vuori poolt 
välja toodud julgeolekustamist heidutuse eesmärgil, mis lisandub tavakäsitlusele, kus 
julgeolekustamist kasutatakse enamasti tulevikus võetavate erakorraliste meetmete 
legitimeerimiseks ning Salteri käsitlust, mis lisas olulise küsimusena teema positsiooni 
laiemas poliitilises arutluses. 
 
Oluline osa analüüsis on ka julgeolekutustamisel. Julgeolekutustamine 
(desecuritisation) on Kopenhaageni koolkonnas defineeritud kui julgeolekustamise 
vastand ja liikumine julgeolekustamisest välja. Lene Hansen on selle mõiste käsitlusse 
teinud olulisi panuseid ning tema julgeolekutustamine läbi probleemi reartikuleerimise 
on peamine käsitlus, mida selle töö julgeolekutustamist arutav peatükk rakendab. See 
tähendab, et julgeolekutustamine toimub kui teadlik samm julgeolekustamisest eemale 
ning ka seda tehakse läbi kõneaktide. Probleemi reartikuleerimine või ümber 
sõnastamine tähendab, et kõneaktides pakutakse aktiivselt probleemile poliitilist 
lahendust ning liigutakse eemale eristusest sõber vs vaenlane. 
 
Töö metodoloogiline raamistik baseerub Lene Hanseni poststrukturalistliku 
diskursuseanalüüsi mudelile. See töö rakendab konkreetsemalt tema esimest 
intertekstuaalset mudelit, mida kasutatakse ametliku diskursuse analüüsiks. See mudel 
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keskendub eelkõige ametlikele ja poliitiliselt laiale publikule mõeldud avalikele 
ütlustele. Kuna töö eesmärk on analüüsida Barack Obama avalike ja ametlikult 
avaldatud ütluste põhjal tema administratsiooni Venemaa suunalist välispoliitikat on 
ametliku diskursuse analüüsiks mõeldud mudel kõige sobivam. 
 
Uurimuses kasutatavate tekstide valikul järgib autor nii Hanseni kui ka Kopenhaageni 
koolkonna soovitusi. Kopenhaageni koolkond soovitas valida analüüsiks tekstid, mis on 
poliitilises arutelus kesksed, sest see näitab potentsiaalse julgeolekuprobleemi üldist 
olulisust. Hansen tõi oma mudeli kirjelduses näitena välja presidentide ütlused ning töö 
analüüsis kasutatigi Valge Maja poolt avaldatud Barack Obama avalikke kõnesid ja 
muid sõnavõtte, mis puudutasid Ukraina kriisi või suhteid Venemaaga. Analüüsi kaasati 
ka pikem intervjuu Obamaga, mis avaldati ajakirjas The Atlantic 2016. aasta aprillis.  
 
Uurimuse empiirilise analüüsi peatükk annab kõigepealt ülevaate Obama Venemaa 
suunalisest välispoliitikast enne Ukraina kriisi ja seejärel ülevaate Ukraina kriisi 
käigust. Julgeolekustamise empiiriline analüüs teostatakse julgeolekustamise elementide 
kaupa. Need elemendid on julgeolekustav tegutseja, referentobjekt ja eksistentsiaalne 
oht, referentsubjekt, erakorralised meetmed, võimu andev publik ja teema laiemas 
poliitilises arutelus. Julgeolekutustamist analüüsitakse eraldi protsessina eraldiseisvas 
alapeatükis. Kõigis analüüsi osades kaasatakse ütlusi erinevatest ajahetkedest 2014. 
aasta algusest kuni 2016. aasta kevadeni ning julgeolekustamise ja julgeolekutustamise 
elementide olemasolu näidatakse Obama retoorika näitel. Viimasena lisatakse 
empiirilise analüüsi lõppu võrdlus Iraaniga. Iraani võib lugeda üheks USA retoorikas 
tugevalt julgeolekustatud tegutsejaks ning võrreldes retoorikat, mida kasutatakse 
Venemaa kohta retoorikaga, mida kasutatakse rääkides Iraanist saab võrrelda ka 
julgeolekustamise taset. 
 
Analüüsi tulemusena leiab autor, et julgeolekustamiseks vajalikud elemendid on selgelt 
Barack Obama diskursuses olemas ning seda võib ka teoreetikute käsitluse alusel lugeda 
edukaks julgeolekustamiseks, kuna publik tundub nõustuvat probleemi püstitusega ning 
erakorralisi meetmeid rakendati Venemaa vastu. Sellele vaatamata väidab autor, et 
Venemaa ei ole Obama administratsiooni poolt täielikult julgeolekustatud, kuna kriisi 
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algusest peale on Obama diskursuses selgelt olemas ka julgeolekutustavad liigutused ja 
pidevalt on rõhutatud probleemi diplomaatilist lahendust, koostöö jätkumist teistel 
teemadel ning seda, et USA ei näe Venemaad oma vaenlase ega vastasena. Seetõttu 
võib väita, et tegemist on kas mõõduka julgeolekustamise või tasakaalustatud 
lähenemisega, kus olulise probleemiga üritatakse tegeleda efektiivselt, aga samal ajal ei 
soovita Venemaad tõrjuda ega isoleerida, vaid pigem rohkem rahvusvaheliste suhete 
sfääri integreerida. 
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